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ABSTRACT 
In the United States, unnecessarily high rates of cesarean sections, 
artificial labor inductions performed without medical indication, and 
other medical interventions that can cause preventable injury during 
childbirth are just some of the indicators of a system that is failing to 
protect the rights of pregnant women. Other deficiencies in maternal 
care in the United States include healthcare providers’ failure to 
obtain informed consent reflecting the risks and benefits of medical 
interventions, enactment of fetal rights laws that infringe on the rights 
of pregnant women, the lack of a comprehensive reporting system for 
maternal mortality, and racial and socioeconomic disparities in 
maternal mortality and morbidity (serious injury). 
International human rights—including the rights of autonomy, 
freedom from discrimination, and the highest attainable standard of 
health—should inform the United States’ approach to solving this 
maternal care crisis. These rights, which are extensively defined and 
described in international human rights instruments, create normative 
and legal standards entitling women to maternal care that is self-
determinative, nondiscriminatory, and evidence-based. The principle 
that pregnant women have definable, innate human rights and that 
states have obligations under international law to respect, protect, and 
fulfill those rights is a compelling starting point for achieving 
substantive equality for women in the context of childbirth. 
INTRODUCTION 
 woman in Northern California, “Ms. C,” had a normal, “low-
risk” pregnancy and wished for a normal birth. A week before 
her due date, her doctor suggested labor induction with Pitocin, an 
artificial oxytocin drug, despite no medical need for induction. Ms. C 
refused and went into labor naturally a week later. At the hospital, 
without Ms. C’s consultation or consent, a nurse followed the doctor’s 
phone order to start a Pitocin drip. Her artificial induction caused a 
A
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hard, painful labor that might have been less painful if the labor had 
taken a natural, albeit longer, course. Ms. C was given a catheter 
injection through the epidural space of her spinal cord to block the 
pain. Without feeling in her lower body, Ms. C did not know that she 
was fully dilated and ready to push. Her nurses again consulted the 
doctor over the phone and were advised to take measures to forestall 
the birth until the doctor arrived. They pushed on the fetus’s head and 
gave Ms. C oxygen through a facemask, presumably because the fetus 
was at risk. The doctor finally arrived and, without asking or 
informing Ms. C, gave her an episiotomy—a surgical cut to the 
vagina—without clear reason. Ms. C could not feel the episiotomy 
because of the epidural, but she had stated earlier that she did not 
want the procedure. The baby was finally born with the use of a 
vacuum extractor, again without any indication of medical need.1 
Dr. Marsden Wagner describes the story above in Born in the USA: 
How a Broken Maternity System Must Be Fixed to Put Women and 
Children First. It is one of many such stories reported by journalists, 
doctors, midwives, and human rights advocates who are working to 
change common practices of over-intervention and iatrogenic (doctor-
caused)2 harm in maternal care in the United States. The experience 
of Marsden’s Ms. C reflects hospital practices that have changed little 
since medicalized birth became the norm in the United States.3 In 
2014, cesarean section (“C-section”), labor induction at term or pre-
term, epidural pain management, and episiotomy4 are common 
 
1 MARSDEN WAGNER, BORN IN THE USA: HOW A BROKEN MATERNITY SYSTEM MUST 
BE FIXED TO PUT WOMEN AND CHILDREN FIRST 3–4 (2006). Wagner passed away April 
27, 2014. He was a perinatologist and perinatal epidemiologist and served as head of 
Maternal and Child Health for the Regional Office for Europe of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) for fifteen years. 
2 Id. at 2. 
3 See generally CHERYL KRASNICK WARSH, Modern Childbirth: Mothers and Doctors, 
in PRESCRIBED NORMS: WOMEN AND HEALTH IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 
SINCE 1800 (2010) (describing the progression of medicalized childbirth in North America 
in the twentieth century, including: (1) the development of pain management from ether 
and chloroform in the early 1900s, to nitrous oxide and the “Twilight Sleep” cocktail of 
morphine and scopolamine in 1914 and 1915, to local anesthetics in the 1950s, and the 
common use of epidural anesthesia by the 1990s; (2) the advent and subsequent routine 
use of forceps in the 1920s and the development of vacuum extraction to replace forceps; 
(3) the development of episiotomy as an intervention accompanying the use of forceps, 
and its subsequent use as a standard procedure for non-cesarean births; and (4) the 
increased use of electronic fetal monitoring and cesarean section in the last half of the 
twentieth century). 
4 Rates of episiotomy have decreased, but according to a recent national survey, when 
this intervention is performed, it is often done without the mother taking part in the 
decision. The survey reports a seventeen percent rate of episiotomy among new mothers 
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medical interventions used for labor management and delivery in 
hospitals, where ninety-nine percent of U.S. women give birth.5 Some 
doctors would see Ms. C’s childbirth, in which several of these 
interventions were used, as having a good outcome: a mother and her 
baby left the hospital relatively healthy. But such interventions are not 
without risks. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) does not recommend labor 
induction for low-risk women before forty-one weeks gestation.6 
However, in the United States, at least twenty-three percent of births 
include the administration of drugs to start or stimulate labor.7 
Inducing labor with Pitocin8 creates a risk of overly rapid uterine 
contractions and uterine rupture, which can be fatal for both mother 
and child. Nonmedically indicated induction has been shown to 
increase the likelihood of C-section for first-time mothers9 and has 
raised rates of preterm births and related complications.10 Induction 
 
who gave birth vaginally in hospitals. EUGENE R. DECLERCQ ET AL., CHILDBIRTH 
CONNECTION, LISTENING TO MOTHERS III: PREGNANCY AND BIRTH, REPORT OF THE 
THIRD NATIONAL U.S. SURVEY OF WOMEN’S CHILDBEARING EXPERIENCES 19 (2013) 
[hereinafter LISTENING TO MOTHERS III]. Of those mothers, only forty-one percent said 
they had a choice. Id. at 36. 
5 AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY DELIVERY: THE MATERNAL HEALTH CARE CRISIS IN THE 
USA: ONE YEAR UPDATE 4 (2011), AI Index AMR 51/108/2011[hereinafter DEADLY 
DELIVERY ONE YEAR UPDATE]. 
6 WHO, WHO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDUCTION OF LABOUR 5, 13 (2011) 
[hereinafter INDUCTION OF LABOUR], available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications 
/2011/9789241501156_eng.pdf; see generally WHO, WHO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
AUGMENTATION OF LABOUR (2014) [hereinafter AUGMENTATION OF LABOUR], available 
at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/112825/1/9789241507363_eng.pdf. 
7 AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY DELIVERY: THE MATERNAL HEALTH CARE CRISIS IN THE 
USA 78 (2010), AI Index AMR 51/007/2010 [hereinafter DEADLY DELIVERY]. 
8 Other methods of artificial induction include the administration of prostaglandins or 
manual rupturing of the amniotic membranes. See INDUCTION OF LABOUR, supra note 6, 
at 6. 
9 CAROL SAKALA & MAUREEN P. CORRY, EVIDENCE-BASED MATERNITY CARE: 
WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT CAN ACHIEVE 38 (2008); see also Rosalie M. Grivell et al., 
Maternal and Neonatal Outcomes Following Induction of Labor: A Cohort Study, 91 
ACTA OBSTETRICIA ET GYNECOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 198 (2012) (describing similar 
increases in South Australia in the risk of cesarean section, postpartum complications, and 
neonatal complications when labor induction is used in the absence of maternal or fetal 
indications). 
10 See MARCH OF DIMES ET AL., BORN TOO SOON: THE GLOBAL ACTION REPORT ON 
PRETERM BIRTH 5 (Christopher Howson et al. eds., 2012) (recommending reduction of 
nonmedically indicated labor inductions and cesarean births especially before thirty-nine 
weeks of gestation in order to reduce preterm births); JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., NAT’L 
CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, BORN A BIT TOO EARLY: RECENT TRENDS IN LATE 
PRETERM BIRTHS 1 (2009) (showing that the percentage of late preterm, thirty-four to 
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also restricts mobility and can cause intense labor pains, so a pain-
blocking epidural often follows.11 Epidurals inhibit the natural 
production of helpful birth hormones, increase the likelihood of 
episiotomy or vaginal tearing, and can lengthen labor and disrupt 
breastfeeding.12 Twenty to thirty percent of epidural patients 
experience a drop in blood pressure requiring additional drug 
treatment, and fifteen to twenty percent develop fevers that may 
necessitate immediate separation of mother and child after birth.13 In 
rare cases, epidural anesthesia can result in paralysis or death.14 
Research shows that episiotomy increases risks of future painful 
sexual intercourse, fecal incontinence, and extended tears requiring 
suturing,15 whereas some proponents’ claims of the procedure’s 
benefits are unsupported by evidence.16 Vacuum extraction also puts 
the mother at risk of permanent urinary and fecal incontinence and 
creates a risk of brain hemorrhage for the child being born.17 The 
interventions performed during Ms. C’s labor without medical 
indication and without her informed consent (or despite her express 
lack of consent) subjected her to each of these preventable risks. 
Medical interventions are at times necessary in birth. Access to 
emergency obstetric care is one of the most significant factors 
distinguishing the quality of maternal care in the United States from 
that of many lower income countries with higher rates of maternal 
morbidity and mortality.18 However, when such interventions are 
used without clear evidence-based indications that the expected 
benefits will outweigh the potential harms, they can negatively impact 
women’s health. And when they are employed without free and 
 
thirty-six weeks gestation, singleton births resulting from labor induction increased by 
twenty percent between 1990 and 2006). 
11 WAGNER, supra note 1, at 39. 
12 See id. at 63–65. 
13 JENNIFER BLOCK, PUSHED: THE PAINFUL TRUTH ABOUT CHILDBIRTH AND MODERN 
MATERNITY CARE 172 (2007). 
14 WAGNER, supra note 1, at 7. 
15 Id. at 57–58 (citing Katherine Hartmann et al., Outcomes of Routine Episiotomy: A 
Systematic Review, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 2141–48 (2005)). 
16 WAGNER, supra note 1, at 58 (unsupported claimed benefits include the prevention 
of third-degree tears and pelvic floor damage); accord WHO DEP’T OF REPRODUCTIVE 
HEALTH AND RESEARCH, CARE IN NORMAL BIRTH: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 29, WHO Doc. 
WHO/FRH/MSM/96.24 (1996) [hereinafter CARE IN NORMAL BIRTH], available at 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/1996/WHO _FRH_MSM_96.24.pdf?ua=1. 
17 WAGNER, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
18 See generally Rebecca J. Cook et al., Advancing Safe Motherhood Through Human 
Rights (WHO, Occasional Paper No. 5, 2001), WHO Doc. WHO/RHR/01.5. 
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informed consent, which requires that the patients understand the 
risks of and alternatives to treatment, they violate women’s right to 
make informed choices about their health and bodily integrity. The 
Department of Reproductive Health and Research at the WHO 
recommends that care in birth be achieved with “the least possible 
level of intervention that is compatible with safety.”19 Over-
intervention can range from seemingly minor practices, such as 
requiring routine intravenous infusion instead of oral nutrition during 
labor,20 to major abdominal surgery when a woman undergoes an 
unnecessary C-section. These practices disempower and discriminate 
against women. Over-intervention in U.S. maternity wards has 
contributed to a rate of C-section that is more than twice as high as 
that recommended by the WHO,21 unnecessary maternal morbidity, 
and gross infringement on pregnant women’s rights.22 
These documented deficiencies in maternal care23 are evidence that 
the United States is experiencing a maternal care crisis. But a solution 
to this crisis, or at least the seeds of a solution, exists in international 
 
19 CARE IN NORMAL BIRTH, supra note 16, at 4. 
20 This practice unnecessarily restricts movement during labor. Id. at 9–10. 
21 DEADLY DELIVERY ONE YEAR UPDATE, supra note 5, at 8. 
22 Over-intervention also contributes to under-intervention. A 2010 WHO report 
examines the implications of “needed” and “excess” C-sections, tying together the lack of 
access to such interventions in the developing world and their overuse in the developed 
world. The report shows that cesareans that may be medically unnecessary are 
commanding “a disproportionate share of global economic resources.” LUZ GIBBONS ET 
AL., THE GLOBAL NUMBERS AND COSTS OF ADDITIONALLY NEEDED AND UNNECESSARY 
CAESAREAN SECTIONS PERFORMED PER YEAR: OVERUSE AS A BARRIER TO UNIVERSAL 
COVERAGE 3, 10, 15 (WHO, Background Paper No. 30, 2010). The WHO determined that 
more countries were overusing cesarean sections (rates above fifteen percent) than those 
countries underusing them (rates below ten percent). Id. at 3. Only fourteen countries had 
rates in the optimal range between ten and fifteen percent to avoid death and severe 
morbidity (a standard set by the WHO in 1985). Id.; see also Luz Gibbons et al., Inequities 
in the Use of Cesarean Section Deliveries in the World, 206 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 331.e1 (2012) (confirming the overuse of medically unjustified cesarean 
sections and advocating a ten percent cesarean rate, which would result in global savings 
of $432 million). 
23 “Maternal care” can encompass abortion, care during the postpartum period, prenatal 
care, and arguably any fertile woman’s primary care prior to pregnancy. This Article 
focuses specifically on care of women during labor and birth, including low-risk women 
who experience unnecessary interventions that increase risks to their health, and higher-
risk women whose right of autonomy is violated when medical treatment is compelled 
without consent. The assessment of risk level going into labor is based on a variety of 
factors, including maternal age, height and parity, past obstetric history, and present 
abnormalities in pregnancy, including preeclampsia, multiple pregnancy, antepartum 
hemorrhage, and severe anemia. CARE IN NORMAL BIRTH, supra note 16, at 2–3. A 
generally healthy woman without pregnancy abnormalities going into labor is usually 
“low-risk” at that time. Id. at 3. 
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human rights norms. International human rights instruments such as 
treaties and declarations, along with resolutions and protocols 
generated by human rights monitoring bodies, define and describe a 
number of rights that are particularly vulnerable to infringement 
during pregnancy, labor, and birth. The rights to health, autonomy, 
and freedom from discrimination form the core of a bundle of rights 
that underpin the best possible maternal care. More specific rights, 
such as the right to reproductive health, further amplify these core 
rights.24 This Article argues that these explicit, named human rights, 
which overlap and inform each other in normative content, create an 
implied, encompassing human right to evidence-based, self-
determinative, and nondiscriminatory maternal care. In addition, the 
human rights framework creates state25 obligations to respect, protect, 
and fulfill identified human rights, including taking all necessary 
steps to safeguard rights from infringement by third parties.26 
Recognizing maternal care problems in the United States as violations 
of human rights invokes a state duty to compel legal action and 
systemic change. As the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stresses, a human rights-
based approach “identifies rights-holders and their entitlements and 
corresponding duty-bearers and their obligations, and promotes 
strengthening the capacities of both rights-holders to make their 
claims and duty-bearers to meet their obligations.”27 
 
24 Other rights relevant to maternity are numerous. The Commission on the Status of 
Women points to the right to life, the right to education, the right to freedom from 
discrimination, the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the right to privacy, 
and the right to an effective remedy. Comm’n on the Status of Women, Elimination of 
Preventable Maternal Mortality and Morbidity and the Empowerment of Women, ¶ 8, Feb. 
22–Mar. 4, 2011, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/2011/CRP.8 (Mar. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Preventable 
Maternal Mortality]. Other relevant rights include the right to not be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to private and family 
life, and the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress. Cook et al., supra note 18, at 
26–48. 
25 This Article uses the term “state” to refer to federal states having the following 
characteristics: (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) government, and (d) 
capacity to enter into relations with the other states. See Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp. “U.S. state” is used to 
denote federated states of the United States of America. 
26 U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, General Comment No. 14: Substantive Issues Arising 
in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 22nd Sess., ¶¶ 33–37, Apr. 25–May 12, 2000, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 
2000) [hereinafter General Comment No. 14]. 
27 Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights [OHCHR], Rep. of the OHCHR: 
Technical Guidance on the Application of a Human Rights-Based Approach to the 
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A rights-based approach to maternal care has been advocated by 
the Commission on the Status of Women (a commission of the U.N. 
Economic and Social Council), which has stated that “[g]ood 
maternal health is not only a question of medical care, but 
fundamentally a question of social justice and enjoyment of human 
rights.”28 The human rights perspective “places the individual at the 
cent[er]” of development of health systems and initiatives and 
provides a framework of international accountability for states in 
fulfilling their obligations to improve maternal health.29 By 
recognizing a right to maternal care under international law, the 
United States can better devise health care protocols to meet 
international standards for the appropriate treatment of pregnant 
women, and pregnant women can appeal to these norms to demand 
appropriate treatment from their health care providers. If states better 
tether rights to effective monitoring, resource allocation, and policy 
implementation, the full realization of women’s human rights in 
pregnancy and childbirth can begin to look like a real possibility. 
International nongovernmental coalitions have begun to lay the 
foundation for this human rights approach to childbirth. For example, 
the White Ribbon Alliance for Safe Motherhood has developed a 
“Respectful Maternity Care Rights Charter.” The charter identifies 
categories of disrespect and abuse in maternal care and associates the 
categories with corresponding rights in order to address those 
abuses.30 All of the charter rights—such as the right to informed 
consent and refusal, the right to equitable care, and the right to 
freedom from harm and ill treatment—are grounded in international 
or multinational human rights instruments.31 The International 
Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics (FIGO) has also adopted a 
“rights-based code of ethics for women’s health,” acknowledging that 
“women’s health is often compromised, not by lack of medical 
 
Implementation of Policies and Programmes to Reduce Preventable Maternal Morbidity 
and Mortality, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc A/HRC/21/22 (July 2, 2012) [hereinafter Rep. of the 
OHCHR: Technical Guidance]. 
28 Preventable Maternal Mortality, supra note 24, ¶ 8. 
29 Id. 
30 WHITE RIBBON ALLIANCE FOR SAFE MOTHERHOOD, RESPECTFUL MATERNITY 
CARE: THE UNIVERSAL RIGHTS OF CHILDBEARING WOMEN 2 (2011), available at 
http://whiteribbonalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Final_RMC_Charter.pdf. 
31 Id.; see generally DIANA BOWSER & KATHLEEN HILL, USAID, EXPLORING 
EVIDENCE FOR DISRESPECT AND ABUSE IN FACILITY-BASED CHILDBIRTH: REPORT OF A 
LANDSCAPE ANALYSIS (2010). 
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knowledge, but by infringements on women’s human rights.”32 FIGO 
calls upon members of the profession to “respect and protect women’s 
rights in their daily practice” in accordance with international law.33 
Such charters and codes of conduct help identify which human rights 
are implicated by the childbearing process and establish that 
international norms for maternal care should stem from these rights.34 
When ideal maternal care is framed in the language of rights, both 
positive and negative (e.g., the right to not have a medical procedure 
performed on one’s body), the disparity between the treatment of 
pregnant women in the United States and the standard of care for 
other adults becomes starkly clear. If the United States is going to 
take maternal health seriously and develop a health care delivery 
system that will better protect the rights of pregnant women, the state 
as a guarantor and potential violator of human rights must embrace a 
rights-based approach that identifies problems in terms of rights 
violations and links those problems with the state’s international legal 
duty to develop solutions. 
I 
IDENTIFYING THE UNITED STATES’ OBLIGATIONS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International human rights law defines not only globally 
recognized human rights norms, but also state obligations related to 
those rights. The United States is bound to uphold human rights by 
 
32 Resolution on Professional and Ethical Responsibilities Concerning Sexual and 
Reproductive Rights (Santiago, 2003), INT’L FED’N OF GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS, 
http://www.figo.org/sites/default/files/uploads/OurWork/2003%20Res%20on%20Prof%20
and%20Eth%20Responsibilities%20Concerning%20Sexual%20and%20Reproductive%20
Rights.pdf (last visited July 27, 2014). 
33 Id. 
34 Once human rights are identified, dissemination of knowledge about those rights is 
the next important step in order for individuals to be empowered by human rights law. 
Human Rights in Childbirth, based in The Hague, Netherlands, and Portland, Oregon, is 
working with regional coordinators to develop and distribute “know your rights” materials 
based both on universal norms and the problems faced by women in particular maternity 
care systems worldwide. Press Release, Human Rights in Childbirth, HRiC Launches 
Campaign to Address Human Rights Violations in Maternity Care (June 16, 2014), 
available at http://humanrightsinchildbirth.com/press-release. Childbirth Connection, 
based in New York, New York, has developed “The Rights of Childbearing Women,” a 
pamphlet with a statement of rights drawing largely from human rights law which denotes 
those legal rights to which women in the United States are entitled and those rights that the 
United States legal system would “probably uphold.” CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION, THE 
RIGHTS OF CHILDBEARING WOMEN (2004), available at http://childbirthconnection.org 
/rights. 
DUNCAN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2015  8:21 AM 
412 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93, 403 
treaties and by customary law. The United States has ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), which create obligations to protect women 
from discrimination and to actively eliminate discrimination in all its 
forms and manifestations.35 The United States has also signed the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ISECSR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.36 Signatories of the Vienna 
Convention have an obligation to refrain from acts that defeat the 
object and purpose of treaties signed by that state, even when the state 
has not ratified those treaties.37 Thus, while the United States has 
failed to ratify the ISECSR and the CEDAW, the government must 
not act to defeat those treaties’ purposes, for example, by legislating 
in ways that discriminate against women or harm their health and 
autonomy.38 
The United States should also be held accountable to international 
standards under customary international law. Human rights treaty 
language typically creates enumerated individual rights by codifying 
preexisting international standards that are generally applicable. The 
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is 
considered to be customary international law and does not require a 
state’s signature or ratification to have legal effect,39 are reflected and 
fleshed out by numerous other human rights documents which the 
United States should look to in fulfilling its human rights obligations. 
Further, as a member of the U.N., the United States should comply 
 
35 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]; 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 
7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
36 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women]; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
37 DEADLY DELIVERY, supra note 7, at 13; Vienna Convention, supra note 36. 
38 The current ratification statuses are available at http://www.treaties.un.org (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
39 About Us, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutthegc/the 
tenprinciples/humanrights.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2014); see also Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) 
[hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]. 
DUNCAN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2015  8:21 AM 
2014] The United States’ Maternal Care Crisis: A Human Rights Solution 413 
with U.N. petitions on human rights. For instance, the U.N. Human 
Rights Council (HRC) has urged states to integrate a human rights 
perspective into initiatives to reduce preventable maternal mortality.40 
As a member of the HRC,41 the United States cannot turn a blind eye 
to such international directives. A state’s accountability to its citizens 
and to the global community through these international law 
mechanisms is a foundational principle of a rights-based approach to 
maternal care. 
II 
IDENTIFYING PREGNANT WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS 
A complex web of factors informs the United States’ current state 
of maternal care, including the presence of a fetus; the intense 
physicality of childbirth and risk of harm to both woman and fetus 
during labor and birth; and the historical, social, and political 
responses to those physiological facts. These factors make women’s 
rights to health, autonomy, and freedom from discrimination 
particularly susceptible to violation by government and private actors 
during pregnancy and birth. Although there is no distinctive right to 
maternal care in the text of international human rights treaties, that 
right is implied by the convergence of underlying rights in the 
international human rights context. 
The right to health, one of the most fundamental international 
human rights, necessitates the use of evidence-based care to prevent 
iatrogenic harm in childbirth. Childbirth is the most common reason 
for hospitalization in the United States,42 and pathology- and surgery-
oriented obstetric specialists attend seventy-nine percent of U.S. 
births.43 In that environment, medical intervention has the potential to 
both prevent and create harm. As delineated in international human 
rights documents, the “highest attainable” standard includes the right 
 
40 See H.R.C. Res. 11/8, Rep. of the Human Rights Council [HRC], 11th Sess., June 2–
18, 2009, U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., Supp. No. 63, A/64/53, at 134–36 (June 17, 2009) 
[hereinafter H.R.C. Res. 11/8]; H.R.C. Res. 15/17, Rep. of the HRC, 15th Sess., Sept. 13–
Oct. 1, 2010, U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 53 A, A/65/53/Add.1, at 46-48 (Oct. 1, 
2010). 
41 Current Membership of the Human Rights Council, 1 January–31 December 2014, 
OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/CurrentMembers.aspx (last 
visited June 29, 2014). 
42 Jennifer Podulka et al., Hospitalizations Related to Childbirth, 2008, HEALTHCARE 
COST AND UTILIZATION PROJECT (Apr. 2011), http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/stat 
briefs/sb110.jsp. 
43 SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 9, at 62. 
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to receive the benefits of medical intervention when necessary and an 
equally important right to be assisted with natural birth, without 
invasive procedures, if those procedures have unknown effectiveness 
or the potential to cause more harm than good to women’s health.44 
The right to autonomy, which is the right to make choices about 
one’s personal dignity and bodily integrity, supports the right to 
health. The right to autonomy affirms that women, as rights-holders, 
have the power to decide how to claim and seek enforcement of their 
other human rights. The right to autonomy encompasses the principle 
of informed consent and is in tension with fetal rights laws that 
infringe on the human rights of pregnant women. 
The right to freedom from discrimination underlies effective 
enforcement of the rights to health and autonomy. Discrimination 
against women, and especially compound discrimination against 
minority women, may limit access to maternal health care, prevent 
women from knowing their rights and being educated about their 
childbirth options, and lead to higher rates of rights violations. Where 
discrimination is present, states must work harder to protect and 
enforce the rights of those women who are most vulnerable to rights 
infringement. 
These three rights of health, autonomy, and freedom from 
discrimination are explicitly included in multiple conventions and 
discussed in the context of maternal care in international human rights 
documents. These rights also contain overlapping principles and 
normative content. For instance, the right to health imposes an 
immediately effective “duty on the State to respect an individual’s 
freedom to control his or her health and body.”45 By the same token, 
respect for bodily integrity and control over health care choices is a 
core aspect of the right to autonomy. In fact, documents that seek to 
 
44 The WHO’s recent clinical guide on recommendations for the augmentation of labor 
using evidence-based principles exemplifies this approach. One of the “guiding principles” 
is that augmentation of labor (through the administration of oxytocin or other means) 
should be performed “only when there is a clear medical indication and the expected 
benefits outweigh the potential harms.” AUGMENTATION OF LABOUR, supra note 6, at 4. 
The authors also tie evidence-based care to the right of autonomy, noting, “unnecessary 
clinical intervention in the natural birth process undermines women’s autonomy and 
dignity as recipients of care and may negatively impact their childbirth experience.” Id. at 
3. 
45 Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, The Right of Everyone to the 
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health: Rep. of the 
Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt, Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/49 (Feb. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur]. 
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illuminate state obligations regarding human rights often comment on 
the connections between these rights. The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has identified health as a “basic need” 
and stated that the “‘right to survival’ [sic] and ‘basic needs’ is a 
natural consequence of the right to personal security,”46 and CEDAW 
compels states to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of health care.”47 Due to 
their interwoven nature and their significance in the context of labor 
and birth, these rights should be read together as the core of a bundle 
of rights defining a comprehensive right to evidence-based, self-
determinative, and nondiscriminatory maternal care for pregnant 
women. 
A. The Right to Health 
The WHO first articulated the “fundamental right” to health in its 
1946 Constitution, which declared “[t]he right to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” for all, 
meaning the right to “a state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”48 This 
right was affirmed in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for 
the health and well-being of [her]self and of [her] family”),49 and the 
“highest attainable” standard was echoed in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1966.50 Many 
formal international legal instruments have asserted the right to 
health, including the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD), CEDAW, and ICERD.51 The right to health is a 
 
46 Cook et al., supra note 18, at 30 (quoting Annual Rep. of the Inter-Am. Comm’n on 
Human Rights, 1980–1981, OEA/Serv.L/V/II.54 (Oct. 16, 1981), available at 
https://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/80.81eng/TOC.htm). 
47 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
supra note 36, at art. 12(1). 
48 OHCHR & WHO, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH: FACT SHEET NO. 31, 1 (2008) 
[hereinafter FACT SHEET NO. 31] (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also WHO, Constitution of the World Health Organization, in BASIC DOCUMENTS 
(45th ed., Supp. Oct. 2006) (1946) [hereinafter WHO Constitution]. 
49 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 39, at art. 25. 
50 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, at 
art. 12. 
51 Further, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), and the American 
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truly universal norm: every state has ratified at least one international 
human rights treaty recognizing this human right.52 
1. The Right to Health Includes Reproductive Rights 
Reproductive rights as health rights were specifically enshrined in 
international law by declarations following the 1994 International 
Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and the 1995 
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. The Cairo 
Programme expanded the scope and definition of reproductive and 
sexual rights as international human rights by defining reproductive 
health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being   
. . . in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its 
functions and processes,”53 including pregnancy. The Beijing 
Platform then incorporated the concepts of autonomy and freedom 
from discrimination into reproductive rights (women have the right 
“to make decisions concerning reproduction free of discrimination, 
coercion and violence, as expressed in human rights documents”).54 
In 2003, the Commission on Human Rights confirmed that sexual and 
reproductive health are “integral elements” of the right to health.55 
After Cairo and Beijing, reproductive rights were further developed 
as human rights by CEDAW, the premier human rights instrument 
delineating the rights of women. Article 12 of the convention 
demands that states ensure appropriate health services in connection 
with pregnancy and eliminate discrimination against women in the 
field of health care, including reproductive health care.56 The “highest 
attainable” standard of health is further elucidated by the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women’s (CEDAW 
 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man all reaffirm and strengthen the right to health. 
See generally International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93; African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Nov. 16, 1999, 28 I.L.M 156; American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. Supp. 133 (1948). 
52 FACT SHEET NO. 31, supra note 48, at 1. 
53 Rep. of the Int’l Conference on Population and Dev., Sept. 5–13, 1994, ¶ 7.2, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (Oct. 18, 1994). 
54 Rep. of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Sept. 4–15, 1995, ¶ 95, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (Sept. 15, 1995). 
55 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 45, ¶ 9 (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
56 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
supra note 36, at art. 12. 
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Committee) general recommendation regarding Article 12. The 
recommendation, developed in 1999, affirmed reproductive health as 
a basic right under Article 12 and declared that it is the duty of states 
to “ensure women’s right to safe motherhood”57 and to “[r]equire all 
health services to be consistent with the [other] human rights of 
women, including the rights to autonomy, privacy, confidentiality, 
informed consent and choice.”58 
International dialogue and documents continue to expound 
pregnant women’s right to reproductive health. Following the U.N. 
Millennium Summit in 2000, all U.N. member states adopted eight 
“Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs) to be substantially 
achieved by 2015, including the goal of improving maternal health.59 
While the MDGs focused on developing countries, their aims are 
universal, and the U.N. has since agreed that post-2015 development 
goals should be applicable to all countries.60 In 2009, numerous 
NGO61 and IGO62 advocates for women’s human rights, in 
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council, submitted a 
joint statement to the Council’s Commission on Population and 
Development urging U.N. member states to reaffirm the MDG 
targets, and explicitly stated that the MDG goal of universal access to 
reproductive health “includes, based on the concept of informed 
choice . . . adequate delivery assistance that avoids excessive recourse 
to [c]esarean sections, episiotomy, administration of oxytocin, and 
other medical procedures[.]”63 International reminders of state 
 
57 Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
20th Sess., Jan. 19–Feb. 5, 1999, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 38, A/54/38/Rev.1, at 
6 (June 25, 1999) [hereinafter CEDAW Report]. 
58 Id. at 7. 
59 The goals established by the MDGs will continue to be pursued at the international 
level through the “Post-2015 Development Agenda” led by a UN System Task Team. For 
more information, see Millennium Development Goals and Post-2015 Development 
Agenda, U.N. ECON. AND SOC. COUNCIL, www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/mdg.shtml (last 
visited July 29, 2014). 
60 U.N. Pres. of the General Assembly, Outcome Document of the Special Event to 
Follow Up Efforts Made Towards Achieving the Millennium Development Goals, ¶ 19, 
U.N. Doc. A/68/L.4* (Oct. 1, 2013). For an overview of the Post-2015 Agenda as it relates 
to reproductive rights, see CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS: A BRIEFING PAPER ON ALIGNING DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
WITH HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS (2014), available at http://reproductiverights.org 
/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Equality_Guide__5.28.14_Web.pdf. 
61 Nongovernmental organization. 
62 Intergovernmental organization. 
63 Comm’n on Population Dev., Follow up actions on 42nd Sess., Mar. 30–Apr. 3, 
2009, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.9/2009/NGO/10 (Jan. 20, 2009). The group also urged the 
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obligations regarding reproductive health have accompanied this 
expanded definition of pregnancy-related rights. In a July 2011 report 
to the HRC, the OHCHR wrote, “States have the immediate 
obligation to take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps towards 
fulfilling the right to health in the context of pregnancy and 
childbirth.”64 To fulfill this obligation, states should follow the advice 
of women’s human rights advocates like those cited above and should 
effectuate the highest attainable standard of health by promoting a 
model of evidence-based care that avoids excessive recourse to 
interventions. 
2. Evidence-Based Care Promotes the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Health 
The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) has explained that the right to health entails freedoms and 
entitlements, rather than the right to “be healthy.” The right includes 
the freedom “to control one’s health and body, including sexual and 
reproductive freedom, and the right to be free from interference, such 
as the right to be free from . . . non-consensual medical treatment.”65 
As holders of the right to health, all humans are entitled “to a system 
of health protection which provides equality of opportunity for people 
to enjoy the highest attainable level of health.”66 According to the 
CESCR, the “highest attainable standard” is subjective because it 
takes account of individuals’ “biological and socio-economic 
preconditions” and a state’s resources.67 The Committee recognizes 
that states cannot ensure “good health” for all, nor provide protection 
against “every possible cause of human ill health.”68 However, the 
right to health still places affirmative obligations on states to ensure 
that health services are provided in a way that is respectful of medical 
ethics, sensitive to “gender and life-cycle requirements,” and 
 
member states to renew their focus on nondiscrimination and autonomy as human rights 
when considering conception and implementation of population and development policies. 
Id. ¶ 2. 
64 OHCHR, Rep. of the OHCHR: Practices in Adopting a Human Rights-Based 
Approach to Eliminate Preventable Maternal Mortality and Human Rights, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/18/27 (July 8, 2011) [hereinafter Rep. of the OHCHR: Practices]. 
65 General Comment No. 14, supra note 26, ¶ 8. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. ¶ 9. 
68 Id. 
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culturally, scientifically, and medically appropriate69—in other 
words, evidence-based care. 
Evidence-based health care means using the best, most current 
evidence to make health care decisions. Providers should use relevant, 
valid scientific research70 on the effects of particular kinds of care, 
including the potential for harm, and should refrain from use of 
procedures that are not clearly beneficial.71 Individual situations 
require unique balancing tests of benefit and harm, but as a rule, 
“[e]vidence-based maternity care gives priority to care paths and 
practices that are effective and least invasive, with limited or no 
known harms whenever possible.”72 This model reflects the CESCR’s 
explication of the normative content of the right to health as including 
scientifically and medically appropriate care. It is also supported by 
U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s “Every Woman Every Child” 
campaign, also known as the “Global Strategy for Women’s and 
Children’s Health.”73 The strategy implores the healthcare profession 
to provide “the highest-quality care, grounded in evidence-based 
medicine.”74 
Epidemiologist Archie Cochrane advocated for evidence-based 
care, and the highest standard for systemic reviews of primary health 
care research bears his name.75 Cochrane’s student, obstetrician Iain 
Chalmers, is credited with developing evidence-based care in the 
maternal care context.76 Chalmers’s Effective Care in Pregnancy and 
Childbirth, published in 1989, included a systematic review of the 
field of obstetrics and classification of common obstetric practices 
along a scale of “beneficial” to “ineffective or harmful.”77 The results 
 
69 Id. ¶ 12(c). 
70 The Cochrane Collaboration defines “best evidence” as “the best available external 
clinical evidence from systematic research,” and “systematic review” as “a high-level 
overview of primary research on a particular research question that tries to identify, select, 
synthesize and appraise all high quality research evidence relevant to that question in order 
to answer it.” About Us: Evidence-Based Health Care, COCHRANE COLLABORATION, 
http://www.cochrane.org/about-us/evidence-based-health-care (last updated May 26, 
2014). 
71 Id. 
72 SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 9, at 21 (emphasis omitted). 
73 U.N. SEC’Y-GEN. BAN KI-MOON, GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR WOMEN’S AND 
CHILDREN’S HEALTH 17 (2010). 
74 Id. 
75 Archie Cochrane: The Name Behind Cochrane, COCHRANE COLLABORATION, 
http://www.cochrane.org/about-us/history/archie-cochrane (last updated Dec. 5, 2013). 
76 BLOCK, supra note 13, at 36–37. 
77 Id. at 36. 
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of Chalmers’s study showed that many routine obstetric practices at 
the time were being used without valid evidence of benefit.78 Nearly a 
quarter of common hospital practices surrounding childbirth were 
being used with “unknown effectiveness,” meaning no clear evidence 
of benefit or harm, and a third of common practices at the time were 
unlikely to have any benefit or were actually likely to cause harm.79 
“First, do no harm” is a traditional maxim of medicine.80 The 
development of evidence-based care gave that maxim more 
substantive meaning by discouraging intervention that could result in 
known harms or in potential harms where the available evidence does 
not establish that a procedure is safe, let alone beneficial.81 Because 
harmful effects measured in randomized trials are limited to those 
effects predicted to occur, “[m]any unanticipated harmful effects 
probably never come to light.”82 For this reason, special scrutiny is 
warranted before interventions in pregnancy and childbirth are 
performed.83 
The twentieth century’s legacy of harm from medical interventions 
in pregnancy without clear evidence of benefit is troubling. The 
clearest examples are bad outcomes from the overuse of 
pharmaceutical drugs. Such outcomes include cervical cancer 
affecting generations of women whose mothers and grandmothers 
were given diethylstilbestrol to stop vaginal bleeding (which the drug 
was not effective at stopping), birth deformities from the use of 
thalidomide for the same purpose, and severe contractions and uterine 
rupture from the common and continuing off-label use of the drug 
Cytotec to induce labor.84 These examples may overshadow, but 
should not diminish, the seriousness of less obvious violations of 
evidence-based care, like today’s routine overuse of labor 
interventions for purportedly “precautionary,” but not evidence-based, 
reasons. For example, many mothers who receive labor inductions or 
 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 36–37. 
80 SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 9, at 21; see also WAGNER, supra note 1, at 87. 
81 See BLOCK, supra note 13, at 37. 
82 G. JUSTUS HOFMEYR ET AL., A COCHRANE POCKETBOOK: PREGNANCY AND 
CHILDBIRTH xiii (2008). 
83 Id. 
84 See WAGNER, supra note 1, and BLOCK, supra note 13, for descriptions of the use of 
Cytotec in the 1990s, and Mildred M. Ramirez, Labor Induction: A Review of Current 
Methods, 38 OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY CLINICS N. AM. 215, 215–25 (2011), for a 
discussion on the ongoing use and adverse effects of Cytotec as an induction agent in the 
twenty-first century. 
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C-sections report that the caregiver justified the intervention on the 
basis that the fetus was too large for natural vaginal birth.85 This is 
not a valid medical indication for either intervention according to 
multiple rigorous reviews of the best available research.86 Thus, the 
intervention and its risks were imposed upon those women without an 
appropriate countervailing benefit. 
Another example of a widespread breach of evidence-based care in 
low-risk birth is the use of electronic fetal monitoring (EFM). EFM 
severely limits women’s ability to move and try different laboring 
positions, increases women’s discomfort, and encourages providers to 
“focus on the machine rather than the woman.”87 It also dramatically 
increases rates of C-section (and all the attendant risks of surgery)88 
and vacuum- or forceps-assisted vaginal delivery because of 
perceived fetal distress and providers’ fear of liability.89 Current 
evidence now shows that there is no clear benefit to using EFM in 
low-risk birth, no clear support for improved fetal outcomes, and no 
evidence that EFM can better detect fetal distress than manual 
monitoring methods.90 The WHO, the U.S. Preventative Services 
Task Force (part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services), and the professional obstetric organizations of the United 
Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia all recommend against routine 
use of EFM.91 Yet, a survey of new mothers who experienced labor in 
U.S. hospitals from July 2011 to June 2012 reported an eighty-nine 
percent rate of use of EFM to record the fetus’s heartbeat.92 
In addition to minimizing risks of unnecessary harm, an evidence-
based approach to health care also takes into account evidence of the 
physiological foundations of childbearing to guide the provision of 
care in a way that will not diminish the benefits of the natural birth 
process. For instance, a provider who seeks to use a medical 
 
85 LISTENING TO MOTHERS III, supra note 4, at 36–39; SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 
9, at 21. 
86 Id. 
87 SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 9, at 48. 
88 See infra Part II.B.2. 
89 C-sections increased three-fold between 1968 and 1976, the first nine years of EFM 
use. BLOCK, supra note 13, at 34; see also SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 9, at 48. 
90 BLOCK, supra note 13, at 33–35; see also CARE IN NORMAL BIRTH, supra note 16, at 
17. 
91 See BLOCK, supra note 13, at 34–35. 
92 EUGENE R. DECLERCQ ET AL., CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION, LISTENING TO MOTHERS 
III: NEW MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, REPORT OF NATIONAL SURVEYS OF WOMEN’S 
CHILDBEARING EXPERIENCES, CONDUCTED OCTOBER–DECEMBER 2012 AND JANUARY–
APRIL 2013 85 (2013) (a follow-up report to LISTENING TO MOTHERS III, supra note 4). 
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intervention should include in her calculation of risks and benefits the 
risk of disrupting the mother’s natural production of oxytocin, beta-
endorphins, and other hormones that facilitate the onset of labor, 
create expulsion reflexes shortly before birth, and lead to the 
development of mother and baby attachment.93 Certified nurse-
midwives (CNMs), certified midwives (CMs), and certified 
professional midwives (CPMs) support these physiological processes 
by avoiding unnecessary interventions and providing care that is 
flexible and responsive to women’s needs.94 These professionals are 
underutilized by pregnant women in the United States, sometimes 
because of restrictive state laws on licensing and regulation of 
midwives.95 There is moderate to high evidence that CNMs in the 
United States achieve similar or better outcomes than physicians 
when attending low-risk births, partly because of their tendency to 
rely less on interventive technologies.96 
The connection between human rights and evidence-based care has 
been explicated by experts such as Paul Hunt, the former U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the right to health. In the Supplementary Note to his 
April 2010 report on maternal mortality in India, Hunt discussed the 
meaning of states’ international obligations to take “all appropriate 
measures” to reduce maternal mortality.97 He emphasized that 
“appropriate” health interventions “must be consistent with the best 
evidence in clinical medicine and public health,” and that a state and 
its health care providers are not free “to choose whatever maternal 
health interventions [they] wish[] so long as they are broadly going in 
the right direction.”98 Hunt included “emergency obstetric care” as a 
“cornerstone intervention[]” for maternal health. However, non-
emergent obstetric care that is not “consistent with the best evidence” 
 
93 SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 9, at 25. 
94 Id. at 62. 
95 See, for example, Requirements for Collaborative Practice by Physicians and 
Certified Nurse Midwives, ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 540-x-8-.22 (2012), which prohibits 
CNMs from practicing without “professional medical oversight and direction” from a 
physician. 
96 See Meg Johantgen et al., Comparison of Labor and Delivery Care Provided by 
Certified Nurse-Midwives and Physicians: A Systematic Review, 1990 to 2008, 22 
WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES e73, e78 (2012). 
97 Paul Hunt, Supplementary Note on the UN Special Rapporteur’s Report on Maternal 
Mortality in India, UNIV. OF ESSEX 13 (Apr. 21, 2010), http://repository.essex.ac.uk 
/9818/1/supplementary-note-on-unsp-report-on-maternal-mortality-in-india-21-April         
-2010.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted). 
98 Id. 
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is not compatible with his interpretation of human rights 
obligations.99 
At least one international organization has unequivocally tied 
women’s human rights to evidence-based maternal care. The 
International MotherBaby Childbirth Initiative (IMBCI) is an 
international model of maternal care promulgated by the International 
MotherBaby Childbirth Organization (IMBCO).100 The initiative is 
primarily based on “mother friendly” principles first set out by the 
Coalition for Improving Maternity Services’ Mother-Friendly 
Childbirth Initiative in 1996.101 The IMBCO then took these 
principles, which were initially developed for use in the United States, 
and sought input from experts and international organizations to 
create a more global initiative for maternal care that incorporates 
international principles such as human rights.102 This rights-centric 
model has also been called the “midwifery model of care.”103 Three 
of the “Basic Principles” of the IMBCI are: (1) “[w]omen’s and 
children’s rights are human rights,” (2) “[a]ccess to humane and 
effective healthcare is a basic human right,” and (3) “[w]omen should 
receive full, accurate, and unbiased information based on the best 
available evidence about the harms, benefits, and alternatives so that 
they can make an informed decision about their care and their babies’ 
care.”104 Promoting evidence-based care is necessary to prevent 
iatrogenic harm, protect pregnant women’s freedoms, and ensure 
pregnant women’s entitlements flowing from the right to health. 
3. Maternal Mortality Is the Ultimate Violation of the Right to Health 
The right to life, which itself is guaranteed by human rights law,105 
could be thought of as the ultimate fulfillment of the right to health. It 
 
99 Id. 
100 History, IMBCO, http://www.imbci.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (click “The 
Initiative”; then click “IMBCI – The 10 Steps”; then click “History and Purpose”). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Robbie Davis-Floyd et al., The International MotherBaby Childbirth Initiative: A 
Human Rights Approach to Optimal Maternity Care, 94 MIDWIFERY TODAY (2010), 
available at http://midwiferytoday.com/articles/IMBCI.asp. 
104 Basic Principles of the International MotherBaby Childbirth Initiative, IMBCO, 
http://www.imbci.org/ (last visited July 27, 2014) (click “The Initiative”; then click “Basic 
Principles of the IMBCI”). 
105 The ICCPR guarantees humans the inherent right to life, protected by law, and the 
right to not be arbitrarily deprived of life. International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights art. 6, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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follows that maternal mortality—death resulting from complications 
related to pregnancy—is the ultimate deprivation of childbearing 
women’s right to health. The reported U.S. maternal mortality rate of 
18.5 deaths per 100,000 live births is higher than fifty-nine other 
countries106 and more than four times as high as the goal set by the 
United States government for 2010.107 It is also likely significantly 
underreported due to the lack of a comprehensive reporting and 
review protocol for maternal death.108 Further, more than one million 
women in the United States each year experience maternal morbidity, 
a pregnancy-related complication that negatively affects their 
health.109 
The U.N. Human Rights Council passed a resolution in June 2009 
recognizing maternal mortality and morbidity as a “human rights 
challenge.”110 The Council also recognized the need for integrating “a 
human rights perspective in international and national responses to 
maternal mortality and morbidity.”111 As a result, the Council 
requested that all states “renew their political commitment to 
eliminating preventable maternal mortality and morbidity” and 
“redouble their efforts to ensure the full and effective implementation 
of their human rights obligations,” including commitments to fulfill 
health and reproductive rights under the Beijing Platform, the Cairo 
Programme, and the MDGs.112 The Council’s appeal connects states’ 
internal governmental commitments to improving citizens’ health to 
 
106 Nicholas J. Kassebaum et al., Global, Regional, and National Levels and Causes of 
Maternal Mortality During 1990–2013: A Systematic Analysis for the Global Burden of 
Disease Study 2013, 384 LANCET 980, 990 (2014), available at http://www.sciencedirect 
.com/science/article/pii/S0140673614606966. The United States is one of eight countries 
whose rate of maternal death has risen over the past decade; the 2013 rate of 18.5 maternal 
deaths for every 100,000 births is up from 12.4 in 1990 and 17.6 in 2003. Id. at 990, 998. 
In 2013, the country ranked sixtieth out of 180 countries studied, down from twenty-
second in 1990. Id. 
107 DEADLY DELIVERY ONE YEAR UPDATE, supra note 5, at 5. The Healthy People 
2010 goal of 4.3 per 100,000 maternal deaths has since been revised for Healthy People 
2020 to 11.4 maternal deaths per 100,000 (using the lower baseline figure of 12.7 maternal 
deaths per 100,000 live births based on 2007 National Vital Statistics reports, rather than 
the 18.5 figure reported for 2013 in Kassebaum et al., supra note 106, at 990). Maternal, 
Infant, and Child Health: Objectives, HEALTHY PEOPLE, http://healthypeople.gov/2020 
/topicsobjectives2020/objectiveslist.aspx?topicId=26 (last visited Aug. 1, 2014) 
[hereinafter Maternal, Infant, and Child Health: Objectives]. 
108 DEADLY DELIVERY, supra note 7, at 86–91; see also INA MAY GASKIN, BIRTH 
MATTERS: A MIDWIFE’S MANIFESTA 129–32 (2011). 
109 DEADLY DELIVERY ONE YEAR UPDATE, supra note 5, at 6. 
110 H.R.C. Res. 11/8, supra note 40, at 134. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 135. 
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state obligations based in human rights law. This connection is 
important because it puts the pressure of international monitoring on 
states’ domestic health policies. 
Death from pregnancy-related causes in the United States is 
especially egregious when it results from iatrogenic complications 
such as doctor-imposed medically unnecessary interventions. 
Reducing these complications by improving accountability 
mechanisms and promoting evidence-based maternal health care 
would go a long way toward lowering rates of morbidity and 
mortality and achieving U.S. compliance with international appeals to 
ensure women’s human rights to life and health. 
B. The Right to Autonomy 
The human right to autonomy derives from the concepts of human 
dignity and liberty, which encompass and inform other rights. The 
ICESCR states that the rights incorporated in that treaty “derive from 
the inherent dignity of the human person,”113 and the CESCR’s 
general comment on the right to health begins with the declaration 
that humans are entitled to “the highest attainable standard of health 
conducive to living a life in dignity.”114 The ICCPR guarantees 
individuals’ right to liberty and security.115 In the same vein, the right 
of “self-determination” in the ICESCR, often applied to groups of 
people and the concept of self-governance, can also be applied to 
individuals.116 In the United States, the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments also protect the right to liberty, and the Supreme Court 
has explicitly affirmed this liberty right in the context of reproductive 
choice.117 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24 attaches the 
concepts of dignity and liberty to the right of women to make 
autonomous decisions about their health. The recommendation 
identifies autonomy as one of the “human rights of women” with 
which the provision of health services must be consistent.118 
 
113 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, at 
pmbl. 
114 General Comment No. 14, supra note 26, ¶ 1. 
115 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 35, at art. 9. 
116 Id. 
117 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992) (“[M]atters . . . involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
118 CEDAW Report, supra note 57, at 7. 
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Accordingly, “[t]he obligation to respect rights requires [s]tates 
parties to refrain from obstructing action taken by women in pursuit 
of their health goals.”119 
There are two examples of rights violations that best demonstrate 
the significance of the human rights principle of autonomous 
reproductive choice in the context of pregnancy and birth: (1) the 
imposition of medical interventions based on “fetal rights” rather than 
women’s rights during childbirth, and (2) providers’ failures to obtain 
women’s informed consent to medical interventions during childbirth. 
These actions also violate the right to health when they increase 
health risks to the pregnant woman, and by extension violate the right 
to not be discriminated against when receiving maternal health care. 
1. Women’s Human Rights Should Preclude Recognition of Fetal 
Rights 
The question of autonomy is uniquely implicated in the choices a 
pregnant woman makes about her body because of the presence of the 
fetus. Whether or not a fetus is a legal entity distinct from the mother 
is a complicated question that is at the heart of the abortion debate, 
but it also has significant bearing on the treatment of pregnant women 
who choose to carry to term. When the medical field views the fetus 
as a separate right-holding entity, there is an inevitable conflict 
between the mother’s rights and the fetus’s rights. The conflict is not 
present under English law, where a fetus has no rights until born 
alive.120 This theory carried over to American inheritance law, where 
a fetus has contingent interests that do not crystallize until it is born 
alive.121 The common law background has also persisted in the 
criminal context in many U.S. states, where a murder conviction can 
be prevented with respect to the fetus when a pregnant woman is 
killed.122 Yet, in some U.S. states, the courts have made exceptions 
once a fetus is at full term and capable of survival apart from the 
mother, allowing a homicide conviction for the death of a “viable 
fetus.”123 U.S. states have amended their criminal statutes or medical 
 
119 Id. at 4. 
120 ELIZABETH WICKS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HEALTHCARE 187–203 (2007). 
121 JOHN SEYMOUR, CHILDBIRTH AND THE LAW 136–37 (2000). 
122 Id. at 137. 
123 Id. at 140 (citing Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1989); State 
v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984); Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1994)). 
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liability acts to include offenses against fetuses,124 and some have 
gone so far as to propose definitional statutes including fetuses, 
fertilized eggs, and embryos within the definition of a person or 
human being, which would expand the scope of all other statutes that 
are applicable to persons or human beings, with harmful 
consequences for pregnant women.125 
Under Roe v. Wade, a fetus does not fall within the definition of a 
“person” under the Fourteenth Amendment.126 However, Roe also 
identifies a state interest in protecting potential life.127 Crucially, this 
state interest cannot overcome a woman’s right to health and life.128 
Yet, legislation allowing fetal rights, using “state interest” language 
for support, undermines Roe’s ruling, which excludes fetuses from 
personhood. Such statutes and decisions have led to the 
criminalization of pregnant women who use illicit drugs or attempt 
suicide during pregnancy, and could lead to criminal investigations of 
women anytime they suffer a miscarriage.129 
 
124 SEYMOUR, supra note 121, at 142. 
125 See, for example, H. Con. Res. 44, 2011 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011), or 
Mississippi Initiative Measure No. 26, providing for the creation of a new section of the 
Mississippi Constitution of 1890: “Section 33. Person defined. As used in this Article III 
of the state Constitution, ‘The term ‘person’ or ‘persons’ shall include every human being 
from the moment of fertilization, cloning, or the functional equivalent thereof.’” The 
resolution was defeated in 2011. Such proposed statutes have also been bolstered by 
federal regulations such as the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ 
2002 redefinition of “child” as including “unborn children” for the purposes of the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program. SHEENA MEREDITH, POLICING PREGNANCY: THE 
LAW AND ETHICS OF OBSTETRIC CONFLICT 13 (2005). 
126 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). 
127 Id. at 162–63. 
128 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 931 (2000) (“[A] State may promote but not 
endanger a woman’s health when it regulates the methods of abortion.”). 
129 See generally MEREDITH, supra note 125. Several recent noteworthy cases include 
the prosecution of Bei Bei Shuai in Indiana for murder and Class B felony attempted 
feticide after Shuai ingested rat poison in a suicide attempt while pregnant, Shuai v. State, 
966 N.E.2d 619, 622–23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), and the prosecution of Astasia Clemons for 
“corrupting another with drugs” after giving “birth to a child who, upon birth, tested 
positive for marijuana, morphine [and] oxycodone,” but suffered no injury from drug 
exposure, State v. Clemons, 996 N.E.2d 507, 508 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013). Shuai ultimately 
accepted a plea agreement and pled guilty to criminal recklessness. Laura Huss, Thank 
You! Bei Bei Shuai is Free and More!, NAT’L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN (Aug. 
6, 2013 12:21 PM), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/2013/08/thank_you_bei 
_bei_shuai_is_fre.php. Clemons pled no contest after her motion to dismiss was denied. 
Clemons, 996 N.E.2d at 508–09. She was sentenced to two years in prison, but the Ohio 
Court of Appeals vacated that sentence, finding that although the viable unborn fetus was a 
“person” and thus “another” under the Ohio statute, the statute excepted pregnant women 
from prosecution based on conduct during pregnancy affecting an unborn child. Id. at 509, 
511, 513. For further reading on the impact of fetal personhood measures on pregnant 
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During the final stages of pregnancy and birth, fetal rights laws can 
greatly impact a pregnant woman’s right to choose what interventions 
are used on her body. A grievous example of a violation of a pregnant 
woman’s right to autonomy (and the attendant rights of health, life, 
and freedom from discrimination) is the story of Angela Carder. In 
1987, Carder, then twenty-seven years old, had been in remission 
from cancer, but at twenty-five weeks pregnant she learned she had a 
cancerous lung tumor.130 She was first denied chemotherapy and 
radiation because of risks to the fetus.131 At twenty-six weeks 
pregnant and “high risk,” she was told she must undergo a C-section 
to save her fetus and avoid the risk of fetal death in the event of her 
own death from the cancer.132 Carder’s doctors were convinced the 
surgery would hasten Carder’s death, and she and her family opposed 
the C-section.133 George Washington University Hospital in 
Washington, D.C. appointed an attorney for Carder’s fetus and 
requested a court hearing before a judge who mandated the C-section 
against Carder’s will.134 Carder’s baby died shortly after surgery, and 
she died two days later.135 
In Carder’s case, the court-ordered intervention was based on the 
premise that her fetus would be more likely to survive if born 
prematurely by planned C-section than by emergency C-section after 
Carder’s death, and that the fetus had a right to life that could override 
Carder’s consent.136 That reasoning is in direct opposition to Roe’s 
guarantee that women’s right to health and life must supersede any 
state interest in protecting the life of non-person fetuses. In an appeal 
after Carder’s death, led by American Civil Liberties Union attorneys, 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that when a pregnant 
patient is near death, unless she is incompetent, “what is to be done” 
in regards to the course of medical treatment “is to be decided by the 
 
women, see Lynn M. Paltrow and Jeanne Flavin’s article “The Policy and Politics of 
Reproductive Health, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the 
United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health,” 
wherein the authors review 413 cases from 1973 to 2005 “in which a woman’s pregnancy 
was a necessary factor leading to attempted and actual deprivations of a woman’s physical 
liberty.” 38:2 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 299, 299–343 (2013). 
130 BLOCK, supra note 13, at 254–55; see also In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990). 
131 BLOCK, supra note 13, at 254. 
132 Id. 
133 Id.; see also In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1239–40. 
134 In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1239–41. 
135 Id. at 1241. 
136 Id. 
DUNCAN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2015  8:21 AM 
2014] The United States’ Maternal Care Crisis: A Human Rights Solution 429 
patient—the pregnant woman—on behalf of herself and the fetus.”137 
This rule of autonomy is echoed in The American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ (ACOG) ethics opinion on maternal 
decision making: “judicial authority should not be used to implement 
treatment regimens aimed at protecting the fetus, for such actions 
violate the pregnant woman’s autonomy.”138 
Despite precedent such as In re A.C. and policy statements like 
ACOG’s, other U.S. state laws and judicial opinions focusing on the 
compelling state interest in the potentiality of life of an unborn fetus 
have chipped away at women’s autonomy to make decisions about 
interventions when they are pregnant with a viable fetus.139 A 2010 
case out of Florida, citing Roe, notes that in that state, “[t]he test to 
overcome a woman’s right to refuse medical intervention in her 
pregnancy is whether the state’s compelling state interest is sufficient 
to override the pregnant woman’s constitutional right to the control of 
her person, including her right to refuse medical treatment.”140 Under 
a human rights-based framework that considers but is not limited by 
U.S. constitutional law, the state’s interest in potential life is never 
sufficient to override a pregnant woman’s inherent human rights to 
autonomy and health. 
2. Interventions in Pregnancy Require Informed Consent 
A review of the benefits and risks of cesarean surgery in the United 
States gives context to the human rights principles of informed 
consent and refusal. While court-ordered C-sections may be relatively 
rare, birth by C-section is quite common in the United States–too 
 
137 Id. at 1237. 
138 Committee Opinion No. 321: Maternal Decision Making, Ethics, and the Law, 
ACOG (2005), http://www.acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/Committee-Opinions 
/Committee-on-Ethics/Maternal-Decision-Making-Ethics-and-the-Law, quoted in BLOCK, 
supra note 13, at 255. 
139 See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 
538 (N.J. 1964), and Matter of Jamaica Hospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899–900 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1985), for examples of cases involving pregnant women’s refusals to undergo blood 
transfusions; the courts held that unborn children are entitled to the law’s protection. See 
also Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga. 
1981), and Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, Inc., 66 F. 
Supp. 2d 1247, 1251 (N.D. Fla. 1999), for examples of courts that, in ordering cesareans 
or upholding other court-ordered cesareans, invoked Roe’s determination that the state has 
an important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. 
140 Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263, 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
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common, according to the WHO and ACOG.141 Some C-sections are 
needed when emergency surgery can benefit mother and child and 
lead to fewer deaths from birth obstructions or other complications.142 
Indeed, the lack of access to such surgery is a leading cause of 
maternal death in low-income countries.143 The benefits of C-sections 
are reflected in the WHO’s recommendation of a five to fifteen 
percent C-section rate, which accounts for a cost-benefit analysis 
where benefits outweigh or neutralize the risks of surgery.144 Yet, the 
United States has a C-section rate of 32.8 percent, more than twice the 
recommended rate.145 When the five to fifteen percent rate is passed, 
the risks of C-section begin to outweigh the benefits, including higher 
rates of maternal re-hospitalization146 and a risk of maternal death 
from complications that is three to four times higher than the risk to 
women who give birth vaginally.147 Other risks of C-section include 
infection; improper healing of scars; and serious complications in 
future surgeries, such as abdominal adhesions (creating pelvic pain, 
infertility, and abnormal bowel function), uterine rupture, and 
placental complications such as accreta, increta, and percreta 
(implantation of the placenta along or through the cesarean scar, 
which can lead to severe hemorrhage).148 The bottom line is that a C-
 
141 New ACOG guidelines note the concerning overuse of cesarean surgery in the 
United States and suggest labor management practices to reduce its incidence. See 
ACOG/SMFM Consensus, Safe Prevention of the Primary Cesarean Delivery, 210 AM. J. 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 179 (2014). 
142 Emergency C-sections are an evidence-based obstetric practice where the alternate 
risks involving vaginal delivery under those facts outweigh the risks of the surgery. For 
instance, “absolute indications” for cesarean, which apply to only a small proportion of 
births, include prolapsed umbilical cord, placenta previa (placenta blocking the cervix), 
placental abruption, and “persistent transverse lie,” where the fetus is fixed in a horizontal 
position. SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 9, at 41. 
143 However, over-intervention can also be a problem in countries with significant 
wealth disparities, in which large parts of the population lack access to medically indicated 
surgery. Health advocates in India have noted that the high rate of unnecessary cesarean 
section surgeries in wealthy areas is leading to additional iatrogenic maternal morbidity 
(for example, forty-five percent of deliveries are done by cesarean in private hospitals in 
Chennai). See JAN SWASTHYA ABHIYAN, ASIAN SOC. FORUM, RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE: 
MOVING FROM IDEA TO REALITY 10 (2003), available at http://www.cehat.org. 
144 WHO, Appropriate Technology for Birth, 326 LANCET 436, 436–37 (1985). 
145 BRADY E. HAMILTON ET AL., BIRTHS: PRELIMINARY DATA FOR 2013, 63 NAT’L 
VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS 2 (2014), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products 
/nvsr.htm#vol62. 
146 Podulka, supra note 42. 
147 BLOCK, supra note 13, at 118 (citing MURRAY ENKIN ET AL., A GUIDE TO 
EFFECTIVE CARE IN PREGNANCY AND CHILDBIRTH 362 (1989)); DEADLY DELIVERY, 
supra note 7, at 7–8. 
148 BLOCK, supra note 13, at 116–17. 
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section is major surgery that, like any surgery, a person has an 
absolute right to refuse. 
The United States’ high C-section rate evidences the unnecessary 
use of cesarean surgery in low-risk circumstances in which the 
surgery puts women at a greater risk of harm. Between 1998 and 
2007, the rate of cesarean births for low-risk women without a 
previous C-section increased by forty-four percent—up to twenty-six 
percent of those with low-risk births—compared to the country’s 
2010 Healthy People goal of a fifteen percent rate among women who 
had not had a prior C-section.149 In 2014, a Consumer Reports 
investigation examined hospitals’ public billing records for women 
who anticipated a low-risk delivery (“women who haven’t had a C-
section before, don’t deliver prematurely, and are pregnant with a 
single baby who is properly positioned”), revealing unexplained 
geographic variations in C-section rates for low-risk women ranging 
from fifteen to fifty-five percent at hospitals in Los Angeles, fifteen to 
thirty-seven percent in El Paso, and eight to twenty percent in 
Denver.150 These unexplained variations and high rates of C-section 
for low-risk women indicate serious systemic breaches of evidence-
based medical practice through imposition of increased risks 
outweighing the intervention’s benefits. A provider violates a 
woman’s right to make autonomous decisions about her health when 
the provider performs a C-section without informing the woman of 
the risks of the surgery, regardless of whether the C-section is 
medically indicated or unnecessary.151 The high rate at which 
providers are unnecessarily performing C-sections in the United 
States highlights the probability that women are not being fully 
informed of the risks and are experiencing provider pressure to 
 
149 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, MATERNAL, INFANT, AND CHILD 
HEALTH 16-5 (2010). New Healthy People 2020 goals are less optimistic and more 
realistic; the new target for 2020 is 23.9%. See Maternal, Infant, and Child Health: 
Objectives, supra note 107. 
150 What Hospitals Don’t Want You to Know About C-Sections, CONSUMER REP. (May 
2014), http://consumerreports.org/cro/2014/05/what-hospitals-do-not-want-you-to-know-
about-c-sections/index.htm; see also Hospital Ratings: Avoiding C-Sections, CONSUMER 
REP. (May 2014), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/resources/streaming/PDFs 
/Consumer-Reports-Hospital-Ratings-Avoiding-C-sections-FULL.pdf. 
151 Those risks include not only health risks but risks to future autonomy such as the 
good chance that her provider may not allow her to attempt a vaginal birth after cesarean 
with future children. See BLOCK, supra note 13, at 142–48. 
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consent, leading to widespread violations of the rights to informed 
consent and refusal that are inherent in the right to autonomy.152 
Violations of the right to autonomy are also clear when a provider 
performs a C-section or other intervention despite a woman’s express 
lack of consent. Several recent lawsuits show that provider-coerced 
interventions denying women’s right of refusal are an ongoing 
problem in the United States.153 A health provider may determine that 
a particular medical procedure is essential to secure the health of the 
pregnant mother, the fetus, or both, and that provider has a duty to 
ensure health and to educate the patient about the relative risks and 
benefits of intervention to both herself and the fetus. Yet, once this 
duty is effectuated, the provider also has a duty to refrain from 
intervening if the woman asserts her rights and competently refuses 
treatment. Again, the woman’s rights in this context must override 
any state interest in fetal rights; the right of bodily integrity includes a 
pregnant woman’s refusal of medical treatment even where refusal 
could potentially harm her fetus.154 However, a woman may accept a 
medical intervention to benefit her child at the cost of a higher risk to 
her own health. She is entitled to this choice, provided it is a well-
informed choice in accordance with human rights standards. 
 
152 The authors of Evidence-Based Maternity Care: What It Is and What It Can Achieve 
conclude that “[t]he increase [in the United States’ cesarean rate] reflects changing 
professional standards, with growing casual acceptance of cesarean surgery, lowered 
thresholds for applying traditional indications, and the appearance of new and unsupported 
justifications such as ‘baby seems large.’” SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 9, at 43. 
Twenty-eight percent of women in the Listening to Mothers III survey who received a 
primary C-section reported experiencing pressure from a health professional to have the 
surgery. LISTENING TO MOTHERS III, supra note 4, at 35–36. 
153 In one case, for example, the hospital record contains a note handwritten by the 
woman’s doctor stating, “I have decided to override her refusal to have a C-section.” 
Anemona Hartocollis, Mother Accuses Doctor of Forcing a C-Section and Files Suit, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/17/nyregion/mother-accuses      
-doctors-of-forcing-a-c-section-and-files-suit.html?_r=0; see also Amended Verified 
Complaint, Dray v. Staten Island University Hospital, Supreme Court of the State of New 
York, County of Kings, Index No. 500510 (Apr. 11, 2014) (detailing Rinat Dray’s lawsuit 
alleging negligence, medical malpractice, lack of informed consent, violation of the New 
York Patient’s Bill of Rights statute, and punitive damages after her doctor conducted a C-
section against her will instead of allowing a trial of labor after cesarean (TOLAC)). For 
another example, see Goodall v. Comprehensive Women’s Health Center, No. 2:14-cv-
399-FtM-38CM, 2014 WL 3587290 (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2014) (the federal court refused to 
grant Jennifer Goodall’s request for a temporary restraining order when the hospital where 
she sought prenatal care threatened to begin a process for Expedited Judicial Intervention 
Concerning Medical Treatment Procedures, to contact the Department of Children and 
Family Services, and to perform a cesarean surgery without her consent and over her 
objection after Ms. Goodall described her desire to attempt TOLAC). 
154 Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 690 (Mass. 2012). 
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Cesarean surgery is merely a contextualizing example. The rights 
to informed consent and refusal apply to any medical intervention 
used in obstetric practice, from induction and episiotomy to routine 
vaginal examination during labor.155 Common law has well 
established that providers need to obtain consent before performing 
medical procedures on patients.156 If a person with the mental 
capacity157 to choose does not consent to a surgery, and the surgeon 
performs it anyway, the surgeon commits a battery158 and a 
constitutional violation.159 Common law has also qualified how 
consent must be achieved: it must be “informed.”160 That is, it must 
be accompanied by appropriate knowledge and comprehension of 
risks and benefits.161 The concept of informed consent is not only 
 
155 On July 1, 2014, new provisions of the Arizona Administrative Code took effect 
requiring midwives to perform vaginal examinations during labor. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE  
§ R9-16-108 (2014), available at http://www.azsos.gov/public_services/Title_09/9-16.htm 
#pgfid. Such laws tie the hands of health providers seeking to avoid liability for regulatory 
non-compliance and minimize women’s right to informed refusal of unwanted treatment 
when they otherwise wish to seek a midwife’s services for assistance with birth.  
156 See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc’y of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) 
(“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be 
done with his own body”); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 
269 (1990) (“The informed consent doctrine has become firmly entrenched in American 
tort law.”). 
157 When a pregnant woman is genuinely incapable of choosing whether or not to 
consent, policy considerations dictate that she be assured an independent assessment of her 
best interests or substituted judgment of her preferences. MEREDITH, supra note 125, at 
216. Providers’ failure to follow family member directives may violate the rights of 
pregnant women who are unable to make their own health care decisions. See, e.g., Manny 
Fernandez, Judge Orders Hospital to Remove Pregnant Woman from Life Support, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/25/us/judge-orders-hospital-to    
-remove-life-support-from-pregnant-woman.html (a case highlighting tension between 
fetal rights and the rights of a brain-dead woman who was kept on life support based on a 
provision regarding pregnant women in the Texas Advance Directives Act, TEX. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 1999)). But see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286 (a 
Missouri statute can require clear and convincing evidence of a patient’s wishes and allow 
providers to reject family members’ “substituted judgment” in the absence of substantial 
proof that their views reflect the patient’s). 
158 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 798 A.2d 742, 748 (Pa. 2002); Vitale v. 
Henchey, 24 S.W.3d 651, 656 (Ky. 2000); Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 439 (N.J. 
1983). 
159 In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Supreme Court made an 
explicit connection between constitutional liberty and the right to physical freedom and 
self-determination in refusing unwanted medical treatment. 497 U.S. at 278, 287; 
SEYMOUR, supra note 121, at 204. 
160 See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972) (“[T]he patient’s consent to 
treatment, to be effective, must be an informed consent.”). 
161 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussed 
infra); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Md. 1977) (“This duty to disclose is said to 
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present in U.S. jurisprudence, but is incorporated by human rights 
instruments as a part of the rights to health and autonomy. For 
instance, CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24 reads, “Women 
have the right to be fully informed, by properly trained personnel, of 
their options in agreeing to treatment or research, including likely 
benefits and potential adverse effects of proposed procedures and 
available alternatives.”162 Likewise, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine allows “intervention in the health 
field” only when the patient “has given free and informed consent” 
based on “appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the 
intervention as well as . . . its consequences and risks.”163 Some 
commentators have also argued that the right to receive information 
enumerated in Article 19 of the ICCPR includes an affirmative duty 
of states to ensure the provision of information related to reproductive 
health and choice.164 If women have an established human right to 
reproductive health information generally, women clearly have a right 
to information about risks and benefits when reproductive health 
decisions are immediately at stake. 
The legal rules governing informed consent in the United States are 
inconsistent across the states. Different states apply different 
standards, some recognizing a healthcare professional’s obligation to 
provide a patient with information that a reasonable person in the 
patient’s position would consider “material” to the question of 
consent,165 and some recognizing a duty to provide the “normal” 
information given by a responsible practitioner related to that 
procedure.166 Regardless of how much information is given, 
 
require a physician to reveal to his patient the nature of the ailment, the nature of the 
proposed treatment, the probability of success of the contemplated therapy and its 
alternatives, and the risk of unfortunate consequences associated with such treatment. . . . 
The law does not allow a physician to substitute his judgment for that of the patient in the 
matter of consent to treatment”). See also ACOG, Committee Opinion No. 439: Informed 
Consent, 114 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 401–08 (2009; reaffirmed 2012) 
[hereinafter Informed Consent]. 
162 CEDAW Report, supra note 57, ¶ 20. 
163 WICKS, supra note 120, at 63 (citing Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and 
Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, C.E.T.S. 164). 
164 Cook et al., supra note 18, at 58 (citing Sandra Coliver, The Right to Information 
Necessary for Reproductive Health and Choice Under International Law, 44 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1279 (1995)). 
165 This is sometimes called the “prudent patient” approach. WICKS, supra note 120, at 
82. 
166 Id. at 85. 
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providing information alone is not enough; informed consent requires 
that the patient understands the given information.167 The “reasonable 
person” standard is a patient-centered approach, while the focus on 
“normal information” approaches consent from the provider’s point of 
view. The second approach, known as the “professional rule,” was 
first firmly rejected in Canterbury v. Spence; the United States Court 
of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, recognizing the fundamental 
concept that every human “‘of adult years and sound mind’” has a 
right to bodily integrity and choice about what shall be done with her 
body,168 also accepted that “[t]rue consent to what happens to one’s 
self is the informed exercise of a choice” that “entails an opportunity 
to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks 
attendant upon each.”169 In Wheeldon v. Madison, the Supreme Court 
of South Dakota adopted the Canterbury rule and further focused on 
patient rights rather than provider discretion.170 In Wheeldon, a 
plaintiff alleged that her provider had failed to inform her of the risks 
associated with amniocentesis (a sampling of amniotic fluid used to 
test for fetal genetic abnormalities).171 The court held that the right 
“to know–to be informed–is a fundamental right personal to the 
patient and should not be subject to restriction by medical practices 
that may be at odds with the patient’s informational needs.”172 
Providers must use discretion under quickly changing circumstances 
during labor and delivery, but the need to make quick calls about 
medical interventions does not relieve a provider of the duty to inform 
a pregnant patient about the risks involved in each medical act and 
available alternatives.173 
For a patient to take legal action for a provider’s failure to obtain 
informed consent, she must demonstrate that she was not adequately 
 
167 Informed Consent, supra note 161, at 2–3. 
168 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 
105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)). 
169 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780. 
170 374 N.W.2d 367, 374 (S.D. 1985). 
171 Id. at 370–71. 
172 Id. at 374; see also MEREDITH, supra note 125, at 7 (citing Matter of Conroy, 486 
A.2d 1209, 1225 (N.J. 1985) (“[I]f the patient’s right to informed consent is to have any 
meaning at all, it must be accorded respect even when it conflicts with the advice of the 
doctor or the values of the medical profession as a whole.”)). 
173 ACOG states in guidance to providers that, “t]he ethical requirement to seek 
informed consent need not conflict with physicians’ overall ethical obligation of 
beneficence; that is, physicians should make every effort to incorporate a commitment to 
informed consent within a commitment to provide medical benefit to patients and, thus, to 
respect them as whole and embodied persons.” Informed Consent, supra note 161, at 1. 
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informed and that she would have made a different choice and 
avoided the harm of the action or procedure if she had been provided 
the information to which she was entitled.174 Numerous jurisdictions 
require that the proposed treatment actually caused physical injury to 
the plaintiff.175 But under a rights-based rubric of accountability, 
physical harm following a provider’s failure to give appropriate 
information about risks is not a necessary element—the violation of 
one’s right to make an autonomous decision is itself harmful. 
Whether or not a woman currently has a legally actionable claim, she 
is entitled to informed consent as a core tenet of her human right to 
autonomy. Shifting the focus on informed consent in the delivery 
room away from the provider’s fear of liability to the affirmative 
acknowledgement of women’s rights can empower women to assert 
their right to consent or not consent before a violation occurs. Some 
countries have identified pregnant women’s specific right to informed 
consent during childbirth in their domestic legislation; this state 
acknowledgement of rights reminds providers of their duties to 
inform patients and to respect patient choices at the outset of 
treatment.176 
3. Respect for Autonomy Does Not Negate Duties to Minimize Risks to 
Health 
The interplay between autonomy and the highest attainable 
standard of health raises the issue of a woman’s right to choose a 
 
174 See Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1024 (Md. 1977) (“All courts recognizing the 
doctrine of informed consent require proof of proximate causation. The rule is that a 
plaintiff cannot recover under the doctrine unless he can prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he would not have given his consent to the proposed procedure had full and 
adequate disclosure been made at the time consent was originally given”) (citing Karp v. 
Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 422 (5th Cir. 1974)). Courts have found that for an injury to be 
actionable, (1) “an unrevealed risk that should have been made known must materialize,” 
(2) “the unrevealed risk must be harmful to the patient,” and (3) “causality exists only 
when disclosure of significant risks incidental to treatment would have resulted in the 
patient’s decision against it.” Karp, 493 F.2d at 422. 
175 See, e.g., Brandt v. Engle, 791 So. 2d 614, 620 n.2 (La. 2001); Bankert v. United 
States, 937 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Md. 1996); Roberts v. Patel, 620 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 
1985); Wale v. Barnes, 278 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1973).  
176  See, e.g., Law of Georgia of 5 May 2000 (Text No. 283-IIs) on the Rights of 
Patients; Chapter VII: Rights of pregnant women and nursing mothers (arts. 35–38), 
available at https://matsne.gov.ge/index.php?option=com_ldmssearch&view=docView 
&id=16978&lang=e# (stating that women have a right to receive information on the direct 
or indirect effects of planned interventions during pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation (art. 
35) and to make decisions concerning proposed interventions (art. 36)); Rights of Pregnant 
Women, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 3692 (2006). 
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method of birth—for example, a vaginal birth after a previous C-
section, early elective induction, or elective C-section. 
While women’s rights to autonomy should allow them to make 
choices about their health and bodies, the state has an obligation to 
protect the right to health through an evidence-based system of care, 
including respect for the physiological processes of childbirth, as 
discussed in Part II.A.2. Currently, many women lack the necessary 
information about the relevant risks to make an informed choice about 
“early elective delivery.”177 Yet, these deliveries may account for ten 
to fifteen percent of births in the United States178 Elective deliveries 
of low-risk women between thirty-seven and thirty-eight weeks carry 
a greater risk of C-section, anemia, infection, and sepsis, which can 
harm both the mother and the baby.179 Early delivery without medical 
indicators, whether by C-section or induction, is not based in 
evidence. Medical providers who ignore this science and encourage or 
allow elective C-sections or early inductions, and states that fail to 
regulate these practices, do not promote “the highest attainable 
standard of health conducive to living a life in dignity.”180 Although 
women have a right to refuse treatment that may be medically 
indicated, they do not have an absolute right to demand treatments 
that are not medically indicated, which would place providers in the 
untenable position of actively providing inferior care on patient 
demand. 
On the other hand, providers should support women’s choices to 
try birth methods that have met with historical professional resistance 
where evidence now shows that those methods are reasonable and 
beneficial. “Trial of labor after cesarean” (TOLAC) (often referred to 
as VBAC—denoting the outcome of a vaginal birth after cesarean) 
was fairly common in the 1980s and mid-1990s, but rates of VBAC 
greatly decreased in the past several decades due to professional 
liability pressures and restrictions on access resulting from reports of 
 
177 DEADLY DELIVERY ONE YEAR UPDATE, supra note 5, at 10–11 (explaining that 
“early elective delivery” is the induction or C-section planned before thirty-nine weeks of 
pregnancy without medical indication). 
178 Id. at 11. 
179 Id. at 10–11; see also Comm. on Obstetric Practice, Committee Opinion No. 559: 
Cesarean Delivery on Maternal Request, 121 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 904–
07 (2013) (advising that elective cesareans should not be performed before thirty-nine 
weeks, should not be motivated by the unavailability of effective pain management, and 
are not recommended for women desiring several children, given the increased risks 
related to each cesarean delivery). 
180 General Comment No. 14, supra note 26, ¶ 1. 
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complications.181 After finding that the actual data on maternal and 
neonatal outcomes did not warrant such severe limitations on this 
approach to delivery, ACOG issued revised guidelines in 2010 
acknowledging the benefits of VBAC, including, on an individual 
level, fulfilling patient preferences, decreasing maternal mortality, 
and decreasing risks of complications in future pregnancies.182 
However, ACOG did not change its guidelines requirement that 
surgical and anesthesia personnel be “immediately available” during 
TOLAC, despite a National Institutes of Health recommendation that 
ACOG reevaluate its guidelines, given the little evidence supporting 
that requirement and the resulting shortage of clinicians and facilities 
willing and able to offer TOLAC.183 To uphold the right to autonomy, 
professional organizations, government regulatory entities, and 
individual providers must continually reevaluate past practices to 
make access to safe birth methods available for women, including 
safe trials of labor. 
In exercising their right to autonomy, women also make choices 
about where to give birth and from whom to seek care. Those choices 
are often limited by U.S. state regulations. When regulating care 
providers and settings, U.S. states should support women’s choices 
when evidence shows that their choices are as safe or safer than 
alternatives. For example, studies show that low-risk pregnant women 
who plan midwife-led home births experience high rates of 
physiological birth and low rates of intervention without an increase 
in adverse outcomes.184 The European Court of Human Rights has 
held that the choice to give birth at home flows from the right to 
personal autonomy and respect for private and family life guaranteed 
by human rights instruments.185 Yet, homebirth presents its own 
 
181 Nat’l Inst. of Health Consensus Dev. Conference Statement, Vaginal Birth After 
Cesarean: New Insights, March 8–10, 2010, 115 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1279 
[hereinafter NIH Development Conference Statement]. 
182 Practice Bulletin No. 115: Vaginal Birth After Cesarean, 115 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 450–63 (2010). 
183 NIH Development Conference Statement, supra note 181, at 1287. 
184 Melissa Cheyney et al., Outcomes of Care for 16,924 Planned Home Births in the 
United States: The Midwives Alliance of North America Statistics Project, 2004 to 2009, 
59:1 J. MIDWIFERY & WOMEN’S HEALTH 17 (2014), available at http://ir.library.oregon 
state.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1957/45499/BovbjergMaritPublicHealthHumanSciences
OutcomesOfCare.pdf?sequence=1. 
185 The court based its decision on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, holding that “the right concerning the decision to become a parent includes the 
right of choosing the circumstances of becoming a parent.” Ternovszky v. Hungary, App. 
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unique health risks. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
Worcester stated in the 2012 unassisted home delivery case 
Commonwealth v. Pugh, “All births, regardless of venue, carry 
inherent risks.”186 States thus should act to minimize health risks in 
the variety of possible venues in which women may choose to give 
birth, and states should not criminalize women or their providers for 
those choices.187 Government and private parties must remember that 
the rights to health and autonomy are entwined; actions taken to 
effectuate one right must not violate the other. 
C. The Right to Freedom from Discrimination 
Freedom from discrimination is a fundamental human right 
guaranteed by numerous human rights treaties, including the 
ICESCR, ICCPR, and CEDAW. States have an obligation to prohibit 
and eliminate discrimination on all grounds and to ensure that other 
rights are enjoyed without discrimination.188 The right to not be 
discriminated against during labor and birth is closely tied to 
women’s rights to health and autonomy. The CESCR notes that the 
right of freedom from discrimination addresses an “integral 
component[] of the right to health,” and that a comprehensive national 
strategy for promoting women’s health is necessary to eliminate 
discrimination against women.189 Discrimination against women as 
defined by CEDAW means “any distinction, exclusion or restriction 
made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing 
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women . . . of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.”190 Because pregnancy is 
unique to the female sex, actions taken by health care providers that 
have the effect of impairing women’s rights to health and autonomy 
 
No. 67545/09, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment (2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites 
/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102254. 
186 969 N.E.2d 672, 692 (Mass. 2012). 
187 In Pugh, the court failed to impose criminal liability on a woman charged with 
unintentional death of a viable fetus. Id. at 694–95. The court noted, “We are not free to 
ignore that the imposition of criminal liability on a woman in labor for breach of the duty 
at issue here is likely to have the greatest impact on the most vulnerable groups of 
pregnant women—young teens, victims of rape and incest, the undocumented, residents of 
remote areas—who may have no realistic alternatives than to give birth unassisted.” Id. at 
694. The state should take note of the unique circumstances of those vulnerable 
populations in considering new avenues for access to maternal health services. 
188 FACT SHEET NO. 31, supra note 48, at 7. 
189 General Comment No. 14, supra note 26, ¶ 3. 
190 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
supra note 36, at art. 1. 
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in childbirth are necessarily actions that are “made on the basis of 
sex.” Thus, health care providers discriminate against women when 
they disallow full enjoyment of the rights to autonomy and health by 
overriding a woman’s wishes about how her labor will proceed, or by 
failing to give her the information necessary to make an informed 
choice about a particular medical intervention. Discrimination by a 
state occurs when the state limits women’s personal autonomy as it 
relates to their reproductive health. Discrimination also occurs when 
the government fails to appropriately allocate health resources or 
denies health services that only women need.191 
The OHCHR describes state obligations to achieve gender equality 
and freedom from discrimination as obligations to ensure that state 
laws, policies, and practices “meaningfully address the specific needs 
of women,”192 which in the context of pregnancy are clearly distinct 
from the needs of men. Meaningfully addressing specific needs is 
necessary to achieve “substantive equality” for women, which takes 
into account differences (such as the biological ability to become 
pregnant), as opposed to “formal equality,” which purports to be 
gender-blind and maintains structural discrimination embedded in 
institutions through a history of past discrimination.193 The concept of 
“substantive equality” also applies to the different and specific needs 
of groups facing particular health challenges such as vulnerability to 
specific diseases or higher mortality rates. States must recognize and 
provide for those differences in developing health care policies.194 
Individuals who are part of traditionally discriminated groups often 
experience a disproportionate share of rights violations,195 including 
the rights to health and autonomy. Women who experience 
discrimination on the basis of both sex and race are likely to suffer 
from a compounded impact of this “double” discrimination.196 
According to Amnesty International, women of color in the United 
States are more likely to die from pregnancy-related complications 
than white women, which reflects disparities in access to care and 
information, inappropriate treatment and discrimination by service 
 
191 Rep. of the OHCHR: Practices, supra note 64, ¶ 4. 
192 Id. ¶ 18. 
193 See generally Alda Facio & Martha I. Morgan, Equity or Equality for Women? 
Understanding CEDAW’s Equality Principles (Int’l Women’s Rights Action Watch Asia 
Pac. Occasional Paper Series No. 14, 2009). 
194 FACT SHEET NO. 31, supra note 48, at 7–8. 
195 Id. at 7. 
196 Id. 
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providers, and socioeconomic disparities generally impacting these 
women’s right to health.197 Language barriers also impact women’s 
abilities to assert their rights. A woman who does not speak English 
may not understand an explanation of the risks of a certain 
intervention, or may want to refuse treatment but may not be provided 
an interpreter who can fully express her wishes, preventing her from 
claiming her right to informed consent or refusal.198 Further, a recent 
case report shows that low-income women and women of color are 
overrepresented in cases of women suffering deprivations of liberty 
(including arrest, imprisonment, and judicially-ordered interventions 
during birth) where, but for her pregnancy, the action taken against 
the woman would not have occurred.199 When women encounter 
these overlapping structural inequalities, the state’s obligations with 
respect to nondiscrimination are enhanced.200 
States are obligated under the human rights framework to ensure 
that historically marginalized groups are especially protected from 
abuses of power from both public and private parties, to provide 
culturally appropriate health services,201 and to recognize and provide 
for the specific needs of groups that experience these higher rates of 
rights violations.202 In developing measures for better maternal care, 
the state should address policies and practices that discriminate 
against women generally, as well as those that have a disparate impact 
on certain groups, and act to eliminate those disparities to promote 
effective and appropriate maternal care for all women. The principles 
of freedom from discrimination and substantive equality to address 
women’s specific needs should be touchstones for the United States 
as it seeks to meet its duties to ensure women’s human rights. 
III 
RESPECTING, PROTECTING, AND FULFILLING PREGNANT WOMEN’S 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Once individual human rights are identified, the international law 
doctrine of “respecting, protecting, and fulfilling” human rights 
 
197 DEADLY DELIVERY ONE YEAR UPDATE, supra note 5, at 6. 
198 See generally DEADLY DELIVERY, supra note 7. 
199 Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 129, at 300–01, 311–12. 
200 FACT SHEET NO. 31, supra note 48, at 7–8. 
201 General Comment No. 14, supra note 26, ¶ 12(c). 
202 FACT SHEET NO. 31, supra note 48, at 7. 
DUNCAN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2015  8:21 AM 
442 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93, 403 
should be applied.203 Respect for rights means nations must refrain 
from interfering with people’s enjoyment of their rights; for example, 
states should not limit equal access to effective maternal care for 
specific populations such as prisoners or undocumented 
immigrants.204 Protection of rights obligates states to act to prevent 
the interference of third parties with those rights, so that even when 
health care is privatized, the state must ensure the maternal care 
available to pregnant women is adequate.205 States can be charged 
with violations of human rights when they are ineffective in 
regulating other entities that violate rights.206 Fulfillment of rights 
obligates states to take positive action to promote the realization of 
rights through legislative, budgetary, judicial, administrative, and 
other types of measures.207 
“Progressive realization”208 is a human rights principle applied to 
economic, social, and cultural rights that accounts for states’ resource 
limitations in defining the scope of state obligations.209 The right to 
health is one example of a resource-dependent right subject to 
progressive realization.210 However, other rights and obligations are 
“of immediate effect,” such as the right to nondiscrimination and the 
state’s obligation to guarantee that all other rights are exercised on the 
basis of nondiscrimination.211 Further, even when rights are subject to 
progressive realization, some state obligations pertaining to those 
rights are so central to the right’s realization that they are considered 
non-derogable “core obligations” that are also “of immediate 
effect.”212 According to the CEDAW Committee and the CESCR, the 
provision of maternal health services and the prevention of maternal 
mortality and morbidity are “core obligations” of the right to health, 
meaning that “[s]tates have the immediate obligation to take 
deliberate, concrete and targeted steps towards fulfilling the right to 
health in the context of pregnancy and childbirth” regardless of 
 
203 See id. at 25–28; Cook et al., supra note 18, at 24–26; General Comment No. 14, 
supra note 26, ¶ 33. 
204 General Comment No. 14, supra note 26, ¶ 34. 
205 Id. ¶ 35. 
206 Id. ¶ 47. 
207 Cook et al., supra note 18, at 25; General Comment No. 14, supra note 26, ¶ 33. 
208 General Comment No. 14, supra note 26, ¶ 31. 
209 FACT SHEET NO. 31, supra note 48, at 23. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 24. 
212 Rep. of the OHCHR: Practices, supra note 64, ¶ 4. 
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resource availability.213 Human rights are often mistakenly 
considered “aspirational.” In fact, the language of human rights 
asserts that the rights themselves are innate and that states have real, 
extant obligations to take steps to respect, protect, and fulfill those 
rights while working toward their full realization.214 
Before launching new rights-based maternal care measures, the 
state should identify and acknowledge the human right at issue by 
naming maternal care as a distinctive human right, and the state 
should better define the subsidiary rights that circumscribe that 
comprehensive right. In the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, pregnant 
women may cite the Rights of Pregnant Women statute, 24 L.P.R.A.  
§ 3692, as a domestic legal guarantee of their human rights. This law 
affirms pregnant women’s rights during labor, childbirth, and post-
partum. A pregnant woman in Puerto Rico has the following rights: 
(1) the right “to be informed . . . about the different medical 
interventions that may be performed”; (2) the right “to be treated with 
respect and in an individual, personalized manner”; (3) the right “to 
natural childbirth as a first alternative, respecting her physiological, 
biological and psychological aspects, avoiding invasive practices and 
the administration of medication that is not justified by the health 
condition of the woman in labor or the child to be born”; (4) the right 
“to be informed about the development of her labor . . . and to be 
made a participant in the various actions undertaken by the assisting 
professionals”; (5) the right to “be informed of the various medical 
interventions that could be performed” where complications are 
foreseen; and (6) the right “not to be intimidated about the process of 
childbirth if there [are] no risks involved” at the outset.215 Puerto 
Rico’s law does not provide practical guidelines for health providers 
or legislators to follow, but it serves the purpose of educating women 
about their rights and affirming that the state and private parties have 
duties to pregnant women that derive from human rights. Laws such 
as this one, which demonstrate the government’s unambiguous intent 
to vest individuals with rights, can bring human rights out of the ether 
and into the more concrete sphere of the state’s domestic legal duties 
to respect, protect, and fulfill. 
The immediate, core obligation of states to take “deliberate, 
concrete and targeted steps” to fulfill pregnant women’s right to 
 
213 Id. 
214 General Comment No. 14, supra note 26, ¶ 30; Rep. of the OHCHR: Practices, 
supra note 64, ¶ 4. 
215 Rights of Pregnant Women, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 3692 (2006). 
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health was reaffirmed in the OHCHR’s July 2011 report to the HRC 
on maternal mortality.216 The report identified key criterion of good 
and effective practices in adopting a human rights-based approach to 
maternal care. To fulfill their duties to respect, protect, and fulfill the 
right to maternal care, states should (a) address past grievances, (b) 
prevent future violations, (c) eliminate discriminatory barriers to the 
enjoyment of rights, and (d) improve monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms.217 These components of the state’s duties all contribute 
to accountability, which is “not an afterthought in a rights-based 
approach, but fundamental to each stage of the process,”218 and is “at 
the core of the enjoyment of all human rights.”219 In developing state 
actions to give effect to the right to maternal care based on these 
criterion, the United States should utilize existing expert reports and 
human rights authority to formulate effective rights-based legislation 
and identify the agencies that are best equipped to execute its duties. 
Measures developed in the four areas of accountability identified by 
OHCHR should be consistent with international human rights 
treaties220 and should be participatory by involving women in 
planning and implementation processes and placing a gender 
perspective at the center of policies affecting women’s health.221 A 
few examples of potential actions follow. 
A. Addressing Past Grievances: Redress and Reparations for 
Violations 
Human rights law calls for progressive change but does not ignore 
past conduct. To fulfill its human rights obligations, the United States 
must develop specialized remedies for past violations of the right to 
quality maternal care. This includes ensuring that existing remedies 
can address all violations of the right at issue. For example, U.S. 
states should provide a remedy for a violation of autonomy due to a 
lack of informed consent to procedures during labor, even when the 
fact finder determines that there is no demonstrable physical injury. 
Because the right to maternal care incorporates an evidence-based 
approach, states also have an obligation to reform their liability 
 
216 Rep. of the OHCHR: Practices, supra note 64, ¶ 4. 
217 Id. ¶¶ 5–30. 
218 Rep. of the OHCHR: Technical Guidance, supra note 27, ¶ 18. 
219 Rep. of the OHCHR: Practices, supra note 64, ¶ 31. 
220 Id. ¶ 34. 
221 CEDAW Report, supra note 57, at 7. 
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systems to align with evidence-based care, as liability currently often 
turns on non-scientific opinion-based standards of care.222 
For women who have suffered the ultimate deprivation of the right 
to health and died from pregnancy-related complications, the United 
States should acknowledge the violation through a better system of 
recording maternal deaths. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the right 
to health has implored states to establish a comprehensive and 
effective federal registration system to record and analyze the causes 
of maternal deaths, including nonmedical factors such as social, 
economic, and cultural reasons that contributed to the death.223 This 
system would address past violations by acknowledging that the 
violations occurred, and it would prevent future morbidity and 
mortality by providing better data on the kinds of natural occurrences 
and obstetric practices contributing to maternal injury and death. 
The HRC has reaffirmed states’ obligation to address past 
violations of human rights in childbirth. In a 2014 report on human 
rights in Ireland, the HRC examined the practice of symphysiotomy, a 
childbirth operation which “severs one of the main pelvic joints and 
unhinges the pelvis,” used in public and private Irish hospitals on 
1500 women and girls in the twentieth century without their free and 
informed consent.224 The report calls for Ireland to initiate a “prompt, 
independent and thorough investigation into cases of symphysiotomy, 
prosecute and punish the perpetrators, including medical personnel,    
. . . provide the survivors of symphysiotomy an effective remedy for 
the damage sustained, including fair and adequate compensation and 
rehabilitation, on an individualized basis” and “facilitate access to 
judicial remedies by victims . . . including allowing them to challenge 
the sums offered to them under the [ex-gratia] scheme.”225 This 
report is a call for states to take it upon themselves to devise remedial 
schemes for specific rights violations in order to fulfill women’s 
human rights in childbirth, in addition to improving more general 
remedial routes. 
 
222 SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 9, at 63–64. 
223 Rep. of the OHCHR: Practices, supra note 64, ¶ 33. 
224 United Nations Human Rights Committee [UNHRC], Concluding Observations on 
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2014). 
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B. Preventing Future Violations: Correcting Systemic Failures 
The correction of systemic failures in health care delivery requires 
a comprehensive and targeted approach, with many measures 
targeting specific problems that can cumulatively achieve change. 
The CESCR suggests that human rights may be realized through 
“numerous, complementary approaches,” including “the formation of 
health policies,” “the implementation of health program[s] 
developed” by the WHO or other intergovernmental organizations, 
and “the adoption of specific legal instruments.”226 
In formulating human rights-based maternal health programs, the 
United States should take note of the WHO’s course in modern 
evidence-based obstetric care, which has contributed to positive 
health care changes in other countries. Georgia served as a pilot 
country for this program, and the success of Georgia’s efforts has 
been reflected in the country’s statistical outcomes. C-sections now 
make up just ten percent of all deliveries, and episiotomy rates 
plummeted from sixty-nine percent to just nine percent of births in 
2010. Holistic measures such as partner attendance have also 
changed: ninety-nine percent of deliveries are now partner-attended, 
where none were prior to the WHO implementation.227 Using 
internationally developed health recommendations like this one put 
forth by the WHO can help the United States achieve the “highest 
attainable” standard of maternal health. 
The United States should also take policy recommendations from 
U.N. committee documents. In its General Recommendation No. 24 
on the Right to Health, the CEDAW Committee advises states on how 
to fulfill their duties to protect the right to health.228 The Committee 
recommends that states “[e]nsure that the training curricula of health 
workers includes comprehensive, mandatory, gender-sensitive 
courses on women’s health and human rights.”229 The WHO has 
stated that passive dissemination of guidelines is not enough to 
change providers’ practices.230 For the United States to fulfill its 
 
226 General Comment No. 14, supra note 26, ¶ 1. 
227 Testimony of His Excellency Mr. Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia 
included in the official records of the High-Level Plenary Meeting on the Millennium 
Development Goals, U.N. Doc. A/65/PV.4 (Sept. 20, 2010). 
228 See generally CEDAW Report, supra note 57. 
229 Id. ¶ 31. 
230 See WHO, Introducing WHO’s Sexual and Reproductive Health Guidelines and 
Tools Into National Programmes: Principles and Processes of Adaptation and 
Implementation, at 4, WHO Doc. WHO/RHR/07.9 (2007). 
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duties related to pregnant women’s rights, it must promote changes in 
the behavior and attitudes of health professionals.231 These two 
recommendations taken together provide guidance for states seeking 
to develop domestic human rights-based training materials for 
providers of maternal care. In tandem with such training measures, 
states should evaluate how their health care systems support or 
discourage evidence-based provider behavior. For example, in the 
United States, individual states should reevaluate scope of practice 
laws and licensing procedures to better promote the midwifery model 
of care, since scientific evidence demonstrates the many benefits of 
midwife care for low-risk women, including fewer unnecessary 
interventions.232 
Education measures should also extend beyond providers to the 
patients whose rights are at issue. U.S. women are expressing a desire 
to know more about the complications involved in pregnancy-related 
medical procedures, but their demonstrated knowledge about the risks 
of procedures is poor.233 Education about rights and childbirth are 
necessary to ensure state measures effectively protect those rights. 
The WHO’s Constitution affirms that “[i]nformed opinion and active 
co-operation on the part of the public are of the utmost importance in 
the improvement of the health of the people.”234 By improving 
education and comprehensive data collection and analysis, the state 
can widen the range of care options for pregnant women and ensure 
that they can make informed choices about their health and the health 
of their families.235 
The evidence-based approach to maternal care already has a strong 
foundation developed by women’s rights advocates. The authors of 
the 2008 report Evidence-Based Maternity Care: What It Is and What 
It Can Achieve make several policy suggestions that could be 
implemented through federal government measures, including: 
educating U.S. state and federal policymakers and health 
professionals about evidence-based care; supporting research to 
further evidence-based care; reforming reimbursement processes to 
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promote effective care with the least harm (including incentivizing 
medical schools to teach evidence-based care through modification of 
Medicaid graduate medical education fund distributions and setting 
adequate Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement rates for CNMs, 
CMs, and CPMs); and developing national standardized maternity 
performance measurement and reporting mechanisms to identify and 
address “current patterns of overuse, underuse, and unjustified 
practice variation.”236 
Systemic failures are often interconnected. In addition to 
addressing failures of the health care system by enacting new 
substantive policies and programs to promote maternal health, U.S. 
states must reconsider or reform other individual state laws that are 
inconsistent with pregnant women’s human rights. For instance, in 
order to fully realize health policy reforms for all childbearing 
women, U.S. states must reaffirm women’s rights by rejecting fetal 
rights laws and eliminating distinctions based on pregnancy that 
engrain sex discrimination in the criminal justice system. 
C. Eliminating Discrimination: Removing Barriers to an Effective 
Human Rights-Based Approach 
Many of the above recommendations will combat discrimination 
against women by helping pregnant women realize their right to 
quality maternal care. Yet, gender, race, and other stereotypes 
perpetuated both by formal laws and social norms can greatly impede 
the progress of forward-looking measures.237 To combat the effects of 
“double” discrimination in maternal care, Amnesty International 
recommends comprehensive planning at every level of government to 
address fundamental inequalities in nutrition, education, and housing, 
which are “at the root of general health and maternal mortality 
disparities.”238 The IGO also suggests: (1) increasing funding for the 
Office of Civil Rights in the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services and encouraging investigations into the quality of maternal 
health care; (2) creating a Health Section in the Civil Rights Division 
of the U.S. Department of Justice to address discrimination in 
maternal health care; (3) incorporating culturally appropriate training 
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into the education of all health care professionals; and (4) changing 
Medicaid rules and other public funding services to benefit 
disadvantaged populations such as immigrant women and Native 
American women.239 
Advocates are already seeing some changes in political will around 
discrimination in maternal health in the United States through the 
development of bills such as the Health Equity and Accountability 
Act (HEAA), versions of which were introduced in the House and 
Senate in recent years but not enacted.240 The HEAA seeks to 
eliminate disparities in access to health care and in health care 
outcomes by ensuring the availability and accessibility of culturally 
appropriate and language-appropriate public health services.241 The 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, passed on March 23, 
2010, is also effecting important changes by expanding health care 
data collection and reporting to include race, ethnicity, sex, primary 
language, disability, and rural residence in order to monitor trends in 
health disparities.242 Yet, health care reform continues to meet legal 
challenges that may result in backsliding. Such new and proposed 
legislation to improve maternal care is heartening, but these acts 
should be the beginning and not the end of measures to ensure the 
right to freedom from discrimination in pregnant women’s enjoyment 
of the right to health. 
D. Developing Accountability: Improving Monitoring and Evaluation 
of State Obligations 
A human rights-based public health strategy for pregnant women 
should include “accessible, effective, independent and transparent 
accountability mechanisms at the national level, operating in public 
and private sectors” which lead to “constant[] improv[ement]” of 
existing programs and policies and assure “redress and reparations 
when pregnancy-related violations occur.”243 International human 
rights accountability mechanisms can provide guidance for such 
national mechanisms. States that are parties to CEDAW must report 
on their own compliance and must ensure that health care providers 
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and others in the private sector meet their duties to respect women’s 
rights.244 As a signatory and not a formal party to CEDAW, the 
United States does not currently report to the CEDAW Committee. 
The United States should ratify CEDAW as soon as possible to 
formalize its customary law obligations and improve its own 
accountability on the world stage. However, regardless of its decision 
to ratify or not, the United States could mimic CEDAW’s 
accountability system at the domestic level in order to monitor 
progress and setbacks by developing a monitoring committee to 
which each U.S. state could report (and to which non-profits and 
other advocates could also submit shadow reports for further 
accountability).245 Other monitoring recommendations from human 
rights advocates include: (1) the establishment of an Office of 
Maternal Health;246 (2) the local development of the ombudsmen 
model to encourage independent investigation into state and third 
party fulfillment of duties;247 (3) the incorporation of human rights 
standards into professional associations’ codes of ethics and licensing 
mechanisms;248 (4) the establishment of human rights commissions at 
various levels of government;249 and (5) the development of 
administrative or judicial complaint and inquiry procedures to allow 
individuals redress for rights violations.250 For each new state 
measure that is developed to address past violations, prevent future 
violations, and eliminate discrimination, some accompanying form of 
evaluation is necessary to hold the state accountable to its rights-
generated duties. 
CONCLUSION 
The problems with maternal care identified here are gaining notice 
as more and more women speak out about coercive practices, 
unnecessary morbidity, and discrimination during labor and birth in 
the United States. In Congress, Representative Lucille Roybal-Allard 
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has introduced the Maximizing Optimal Maternity Services for the 
21st Century Act,251 which “promot[es] optimal maternity outcomes 
by making evidence-based maternity care a national priority” and 
calls attention to the United States’ poor ranking in maternal and 
perinatal outcomes, underuse of noninvasive procedures, escalating 
healthcare costs, and racial and economic disparities in maternal 
health.252 The Act calls for the promotion of optimal maternity 
outcomes through noninvasive evidence-based practices, better 
research and data collection on maternal health, and systemic reviews 
of care.253 While this Act and others like it have not yet garnered 
considerable support from lawmakers, they demonstrate the potential 
for progressive maternal health legislation based in human rights 
principles.254 
At the administrative level, the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services has worked with the non-profit National Quality 
Forum to convene a National Priorities Partnership (NPP) working on 
systemic improvements to U.S. healthcare. In 2011, the NPP 
identified maternity care, “specifically, inappropriate elective 
deliveries and cesarean section in low-risk women” as “a major 
opportunity to improve care and reduce harm and costs” in the United 
States.255 The NPP also assembled a Maternity Action Team task 
force of public and private stakeholders to develop community, state, 
and national action pathways to address inappropriate maternity care 
and establish concrete goals to improve care, including reductions in 
preventable hospital-acquired harm and hospital readmissions. The 
task force first identified barriers to high quality maternity care as 
including variation in provider practice due to misaligned incentives; 
discomfort with practicing differently than peers; lack of aligned 
payment and reporting requirements and policies; gaps in provider, 
patient/consumer, and purchaser knowledge due to inconsistent 
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messaging about evidence-based practices; and lack of hospital board 
engagement and an improvement culture.256 The group then agreed 
on three “high-leverage strategies” to address those challenges, 
focusing on measurement and more transparent, standardized 
reporting by hospitals, use of evidence-based tools and practices 
including staff education and “hard-stop policies and checklists to 
prevent non-medically indicated inductions and cesareans,” and 
consistent provider and consumer messaging and engagement.257 This 
overall strategy of combining problem assessment, systemic change at 
the provider level, empowerment of individual patients, and private 
and public monitoring for long-term improvement is a great example 
of domestic implementation of the OHCHR’s multipronged human 
rights-based approach. 
The United States’ maternal care crisis is part of a global problem 
of pervasive deficiencies in maternal care. Worldwide, international 
human rights law can provide the starting point for remedying these 
deficiencies by defining both the inherent rights of childbearing 
women and state obligations to enforce those rights. The United 
States, like other states and international bodies, should act to make 
maternal care an explicit human right. However, recognizing that 
childbirth implicates other existing underlying human rights is an 
important threshold step to achieving evidence-based, self-
determinative, and nondiscriminatory maternal care. 
Once the United States recognizes the human rights of pregnant 
women, it can set new goals for respecting, protecting, and fulfilling 
those rights through various measures. The state already has many 
markers available by which to measure progress, stagnancy, or 
retrogression, including international human rights treaties, 
elaboration of treaties by international councils and committees, 
foreign law that has effected positive change in maternal health in 
other countries, and research and recommendations from expert 
NGOs and IGOs. To be a leader in the human rights arena, the United 
States must acknowledge the applicability of human rights to women 
in the United States and carry out the state’s obligations to its own 
citizens based on international standards of minimum conduct. That 
“minimum” conduct is hardly minimal in degree. The “highest 
attainable standard” of health is no small right, nor is the right to 
autonomy or the right to freedom from discrimination. Most pregnant 
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women in the United States have access to a hospital bed and 
emergency interventions during birth, but they also deserve access to 
midwives, education, and the right to say no to invasive procedures. 
Only a human rights-based approach can help women fully realize 
their rights to health, autonomy, freedom from discrimination, and the 
highest attainable standard of maternal care during pregnancy and 
birth. 
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